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INTRODUCTION 
“[P]ragmatist theory of law is, like much pragmatist theory, essentially 
banal.”1 So wrote Thomas Grey at the dawn of pragmatism’s renaissance in 
legal theory.2 Even Richard Rorty, the philosopher frequently credited with 
reviving pragmatism more generally, concurs.3 For Grey and Rorty, 
pragmatism is banal because it “is the implicit working theory of most good 
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1. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 814 (1989). 
2. The early 1990s witnessed a marked increase in legal academics’ interest in pragmatism. 
See, e.g., Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996). 
3. See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM 
IN LAW AND SOCIETY 89, 89 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (“I think it is true that 
by now pragmatism is banal in its application to law.”). 
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lawyers.”4 As Rorty writes, “Pragmatism was reasonably shocking seventy 
years ago, but in the ensuing decades it has gradually been absorbed into 
American common sense.”5 
Richard Posner could not agree more. For well over a decade, Posner 
has been the leading proponent of legal pragmatism. His latest book, Law, 
Pragmatism, and Democracy, is the most comprehensive account to date of 
his pragmatic vision of the law and democracy. Posner proclaims that 
“pragmatism is the best description of the American judicial ethos and also 
the best guide to the improvement of judicial performance—and thus the 
best normative as well as positive theory of the judicial role.”6 For Posner, 
pragmatic adjudication boils down to “reasonableness”;7 it is “[n]ebulous 
and banal, modest and perhaps even timorous—or maybe oscillating 
unpredictably between timorous and bold.”8 
Pragmatism could not ask for a more influential spokesperson. As 
Ronald Dworkin has noted, “Richard Posner is the wonder of the legal 
world.”9 Not only has he been the chief judge of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, but he is also one of the most prolific and frequently cited legal 
scholars of our age.10 Thus, Posner naturally occupies a position at the 
forefront of legal debates, and he has rapidly become the steward of 
pragmatism in the law. 
A distinctly American brand of philosophy, pragmatism emerged at the 
turn of the twentieth century from thinkers such as Charles Peirce, William 
James, and John Dewey. Although they differed in many respects, classical 
pragmatists generally viewed philosophy as a tool to grapple with life’s 
problems.11 Pragmatists assessed the success of a philosophy not in terms of 
 
4. Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1590 (1990); see also Rorty, supra note 3, at 89 (quoting Grey). 
5. Rorty, supra note 3, at 90. 
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2003). 
7. Id. at 59. 
8. Id. at 73. 
9. Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica Lewinsky, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2000, at 
48, 48. 
10. A recent study undertaken by Fred Shapiro, Associate Librarian for Public Services and 
Lecturer in Legal Research at Yale Law School, has discovered that Posner is the most cited 
contemporary author of nontreatise legal books and articles. As of 1999, Posner had 7981 
citations, while the next-most-cited author, Ronald Dworkin, had 4488. Published but Not 
Perished, AM. LAW., Dec. 1999, at 107, 107. 
11. Pragmatists like Dewey are careful not to insist on necessary and sufficient conditions for 
calling something a pragmatic theory. Calls to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for 
pragmatism risk converting it into the very positions it seeks to repudiate. In Dewey’s view, it is 
“better to view pragmatism quite vaguely as part and parcel of a general movement of intellectual 
reconstruction.” JOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 
IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT, at iv (1910), reprinted in 17 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, at 39, 40 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1981). Otherwise, one would have to define 
pragmatism “in terms of the very past systems against which it is a reaction” or “regard it as a 
fixed rival system making like claim to completeness and finality.” Id., reprinted in 17 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra, at 40. This is problematic since “one of the 
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its correspondence to ultimate eternal truths, but based upon its usefulness 
as a practical tool to yield better, more satisfying experiences. 
Following the classical pragmatists, Posner’s account of pragmatism 
rejects philosophy as a method for securing unshakeable foundations for 
knowledge. Pragmatism, according to Posner, rejects the agenda for 
philosophy beginning with Plato, which is “the task of discovering by 
speculative reasoning the truths that would provide secure foundations for 
scientific knowledge and moral, political, and aesthetic beliefs.”12 
Pragmatists recognize that knowledge is “local” and “perspectival” and is 
“shaped by the historical and other conditions in which it is produced.”13 
Posner’s pragmatism also evaluates proposals “by the criterion of what 
works,” seeking “to judge issues on the basis of their concrete 
consequences for a person’s happiness and prosperity.”14 
Yet beyond sharing these basic positions, Posner parts ways with the 
classical pragmatists. Posner concludes that he has “found little in classical 
American pragmatism or in either the orthodox or the recusant versions of 
modern pragmatic philosophy that law can use.”15 Therefore, Posner 
introduces what he calls “everyday pragmatism,” which he contends “has 
much to contribute to law.”16 Everyday pragmatism is a “pragmatic 
mood,”17 in which “[t]he everyday pragmatist uses common sense to 
resolve problems.”18 As Posner understands it, pragmatism is a form of 
antifoundationalism that rejects formalism. In his book Overcoming Law, 
Posner writes that 
 
[a]ll that a pragmatic jurisprudence really connotes—and it 
connoted it in 1897 or 1921 as much as it does today—is a rejection 
of the idea that law is something grounded in permanent principles 
and realized in logical manipulations of those principles, and a 
determination to use law as an instrument for social ends.19 
 
On this account, pragmatism is a relatively commonplace set of ideas 
and should hardly be shocking to the contemporary mind. Heavily 
influenced by pragmatism, legal realism largely succeeded in dispelling 
the formalist vision of the law as resting upon fixed and immutable 
 
marked traits of the pragmatic movement is just the surrender of every such claim.” Id., reprinted 
in 17 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra, at 40. 
12. POSNER, supra note 6, at 29-30. 
13. Id. at 5. 
14. Id. at 50. 
15. Id. at 49. 
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Id. at 52. 
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995). 
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principles.20 Brian Leiter sums it up: “[A]s the cliché has it . . . ‘we are all 
[legal] realists now . . . .’”21 Although pragmatism shares legal realism’s 
antifoundationalism, pragmatism differs from realism, Posner argues, 
because it “lacks the political commitments of the realists and the crits.”22 
Rather, “pragmatism is more a tradition, attitude, and outlook than a body 
of doctrine”; it is more of a mood than a substantive philosophy.23 Posner 
insists that pragmatism has “no inherent political valence.”24 
Building upon his account of pragmatism, Posner goes on to discuss 
democracy. He rejects models of deliberative democracy that emphasize 
encouraging citizens to become involved in political life and engaged in 
discourse about the issues of the day. According to Posner, deliberative 
democracy, which he terms “Concept 1 democracy,” is unrealistic because 
people will never display the civic-mindedness and interest necessary to 
engage in fruitful political discourse.25 In contrast, he embraces the theory 
of democracy advanced by Joseph Schumpeter, which he terms “Concept 2 
democracy,” where elite leaders represent the people, who in turn remain 
largely disengaged from political life and function only as a check on 
egregious abuses of power.26 According to Posner, Concept 2 democracy 
should be preferred to Concept 1 democracy on pragmatic grounds. 
For the most part, Posner’s theory of pragmatism has been attacked 
externally, mainly by theorists unsympathetic to pragmatism, such as 
Ronald Dworkin, David Luban, and many others.27 While these critics 
staunchly disagree with his policy conclusions, and some criticize his 
account of pragmatism as overly vague or unclear,28 Posner’s theory 
 
20. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 972-75 (1999). 
21. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 267 (1997). 
22. POSNER, supra note 6, at 84. 
23. Id. at 26. 
24. Id. at 84. 
25. Id. at 135. 
26. Id. at 158-78. 
27. E.g., Lynn A. Baker, “Just Do It”: Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 697 (1992), reprinted in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 99; Ronald 
Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998); David Luban, What’s 
Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1996); Steven D. Smith, The 
Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The 
Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535. 
28. Although not discussing pragmatism in depth, Jeffrey Rosen does acknowledge that 
“Posner’s pragmatism is not very pragmatic.” Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 
581, 601 (1995) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 19). Numerous commentators have criticized 
Posner for being vague about what he means by pragmatism. See, e.g., Brian E. Butler, Posner’s 
Problem with Moral Philosophy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325, 341-42 (2000) (reviewing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)) (“Posner’s 
invocation of the pragmatist is unhelpful because his description of the pragmatic judge’s 
aim . . . is so bland as to be almost universally beyond reproach.”); Frank S. Ravitch, Can an Old 
Dog Learn New Tricks? A Nonfoundationalist Analysis of Richard Posner’s The Problematics of 
Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TULSA L. REV. 967, 980 (2002) (reviewing POSNER, supra) (“What 
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remains largely unchallenged from within the pragmatic tradition. In this 
Review, we part company with those critics of Posner who attack his views 
from a philosophical position external to pragmatism. Instead, we contest 
Posner’s account of pragmatism—and its relationship to elitist 
democracy—from within the pragmatic tradition. We contend that Posner’s 
views are problematic not because they are pragmatic, but because they are 
often not pragmatic enough. 
In Part I, we put Posner’s account to the pragmatic test by examining its 
implications. We argue that Posner’s pragmatism offers little help when it 
comes to evaluating and selecting ends, which is crucial for resolving legal 
and policy disputes. We suggest that this failure results from Posner’s 
attempt to excise pragmatism’s theoretical dimension. In Posner’s hands, 
pragmatism stands for hard-nosed “common sense” and “reasonableness,” 
rejecting what he views as pie-in-the-sky abstract theories of reform. But 
what passes for legal pragmatism in this “revival” and “renaissance” is 
often a brand of commonplace reasoning that is more complacent than 
critical. Many neopragmatists are little more than realists who aim to 
account for current problems descriptively and empirically. Such accounts 
of pragmatism provide convenient straw men for critics to attack, while at 
the same time privileging entrenched institutions and the status quo. 
In contrast, we return to the thought of the classical pragmatists to offer 
an alternative vision of pragmatism built primarily upon the ideas of John 
Dewey.29 This account better integrates theory and practice and provides 
more meaningful guidance about the choice of ends. We contend that 
although Posner adopts many of the ideas of the classical pragmatists, he 
diverges in crucial ways that lead him to have internal inconsistencies with 
his own pragmatic commitments and to end up employing forms of 
reasoning against which the pragmatists strongly cautioned. Posner finds 
himself in this position because the pragmatic ideas upon which he founds 
his theory have far more potent and revolutionary implications than Posner 
is willing to entertain. Posner begins on the pragmatic path, but he will not 
commit to it fully, perhaps because pragmatism is anything but banal. 
When seen in its full colors rather than faded Posnerian pastels, pragmatism 
 
is Legal Pragmatism according to Posner? After reading the book I still do not have a clear answer 
beyond vague calls for reaching the ‘best answer,’ considering consequences, and making things 
better.”); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 597, 600 (2000) (reviewing 
POSNER, supra) (“Finally, Posner’s writing—like that of almost all self-styled pragmatists—turns 
slippery and evasive (by analytical standards) when the time comes to explain what ‘pragmatism’ 
amounts to.”). 
29. Although typically self-styled pragmatists view their thought self-consciously in 
relationship to the work of James and Dewey, some contemporary pragmatists, such as Jules 
Coleman, locate the source of their indebtedness in other thinkers. Coleman draws upon later 
accounts of pragmatism developed in the works of authors such as Wilfrid Sellars, W.V.O. Quine, 
Donald Davidson, and Hilary Putnam. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN 
DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 6 n.6 (2001). 
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is radical. Its ideas unsettle many of the institutions and “realities” that 
Posner takes as given. 
In Part II, we turn to Posner’s theory of democracy. Surprisingly, in 
light of Posner’s insistence that pragmatism has no political valence, Posner 
attempts to use pragmatism to reach his conclusion that Concept 2 
democracy is normatively superior to Concept 1 democracy, a conclusion 
with deep political valences. We demonstrate that Posner’s justification 
for Concept 2 democracy is not pragmatic, for it not only has 
inconsistencies with Posner’s own version of pragmatism but also radically 
diverges from some of the most fundamental notions of the classical 
pragmatists. Having built his theory on pragmatic ideas, Posner must deal 
with their implications, which we argue undermine his theory of 
democracy. Additionally, we contend that pragmatism does have a political 
valence—one that links it more closely with Concept 1 democracy than 
Concept 2. 
I.  PRAGMATISM 
Posner has two goals in writing his book. He aims to explore the 
implications of pragmatism in law and to discuss the relationship between 
legal pragmatism and democracy.30 The central thrust of pragmatism for 
Posner is the rejection of “pieties” and “conceptualisms.” “Among the 
conceptualisms rejected are moral, legal, and political theory when offered 
to guide legal and other official decisionmaking.”31 
 Although acknowledging roots in a lineage of classical pragmatists 
and adopting many of the key ideas of these thinkers, Posner breaks ranks 
with them, advocating a brand of pragmatism he calls “everyday 
pragmatism.”32 Posner labels the contemporary philosophical tradition that 
has grown out of pragmatism as “orthodox,” and concludes that “orthodox 
pragmatism has little to contribute to law at the operational level. It has 
become a part of technical philosophy, in which few judges or practicing 
lawyers take any interest.”33 The problem with orthodox pragmatism stems 
from a problem with philosophy more generally. Philosophy, for Posner, 
has little of use to say about legal and political issues. Therefore, “appeals 
to pragmatism to guide adjudication and other governmental action should 
largely be cut loose from philosophy.”34 Posner goes on to critique Richard 
Rorty, John Dewey, and other theorists who hope to “enable philosophers 
to make a constructive contribution to the solution of practical social 
 
30. POSNER, supra note 6, at 2. 
31. Id. at 3. 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. Id. at 41. 
34. Id. at 4. 
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problems, including legal problems.”35 For Posner, this task is not 
feasible.36 The problem, in short, is philosophy, and Posner attempts to 
skim off the top of pragmatism several of its key ideas and discard the rest. 
The end product is “everyday pragmatism,” a leaner, more useful, more 
practical pragmatism. As Posner describes it, “Everyday pragmatism is the 
mindset denoted by the popular usage of the word ‘pragmatic,’ meaning 
practical and business-like, ‘no-nonsense,’ disdainful of abstract theory and 
intellectual pretension, contemptuous of moralizers and utopian 
dreamers.”37 
According to Posner, “Everyday pragmatists tend to be ‘dry,’ 
no-nonsense types. Philosophical pragmatists tend to be ‘wets,’ and to 
believe that somehow their philosophy really can clear the decks for liberal 
social policies, though this is largely an accident of the fact that John 
Dewey was a prominent liberal.”38 Pragmatism’s “core is merely a 
disposition to base action on facts and consequences rather than on 
conceptualisms, generalities, pieties, and slogans.”39 
Posner observes that pragmatism “is not hostile to all theory. . . . [It] is 
hostile to the idea of using abstract moral and political theory to guide 
judicial decisionmaking.”40 In contrast, “theories that seek to guide 
empirical inquiry are welcomed in pragmatic adjudication.”41 Although the 
pragmatist is open-minded to insights from a variety of disciplines,42 she 
should be wary of philosophy, which for Posner is little more than 
“intellectual pretension” that isn’t helpful in grappling with legal and policy 
issues.43 Therefore, the Posnerian pragmatist should reject philosophical 
theory as having no role to play in the law. 
Posner is not alone in his view that pragmatism urges the abandonment 
of philosophical theorizing. Indeed, pragmatism is often criticized for being 
antitheoretical. For example, Steven Smith argues that “[l]egal pragmatism 
is best understood as a kind of exhortation about theorizing.”44 
This thin account of pragmatism runs into serious problems, however, 
when it comes to guiding the normative ends we should adopt. These 
 
35. Id. at 13. Interestingly, Posner refers to Dewey as “Professor Dewey” as he criticizes 
Dewey’s more radical ideas about democracy and politics. See id. at 112. 
36. See id. at 13. 
37. Id. at 49-50. 
38. Id. at 12. 
39. Id. at 3. 
40. Id. at 60. 
41. Id. at 77. 
42. As Daniel Farber notes, “In the legal context, pragmatism implies a certain degree of 
eclecticism. Pragmatism provides no reason to exclude consideration of original intent, precedent, 
philosophy, social science, or anything else that might be appropriate and helpful in resolving a 
hard case.” Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First 
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169. 
43. POSNER, supra note 6, at 50. 
44. Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990). 
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problems emerge most explicitly when Posner discusses how the pragmatic 
judge should adjudicate cases. In articulating his account of pragmatic 
adjudication, he describes pragmatism as a method that is helpful in 
analyzing whether the means we select can further our ends. But Posner’s 
pragmatism has little to say about the normative ends we choose to adopt. 
Critics of pragmatism often attack pragmatism on this basis, dismissing it as 
empty. Pragmatism, on this account, is nothing more than a tool that can be 
used by anybody to achieve whatever ends they have in mind. But as we 
demonstrate, pragmatism can have something to say about our normative 
ends. Although Posnerian pragmatism rings hollow, a thicker account of 
pragmatism amounts to much more. 
A. Means and Ends 
Posner begins his account of pragmatic adjudication by defending it 
against charges that it counsels judges to ignore precedent and decide cases 
simply based on their personal views about the best outcome. Ronald 
Dworkin, legal pragmatism’s well-known nemesis, argues that pragmatism 
is disrespectful of the past in general, and precedent in particular. In Law’s 
Empire, he writes, “The pragmatist thinks judges should always do the best 
they can for the future, in the circumstances, unchecked by any need to 
respect or secure consistency in principle with what other officials have 
done or will do.”45 Dworkin views the pragmatist as focused almost 
exclusively on expediency, and he is not alone in this view.46 
Posner emphatically and correctly rejects this account of pragmatic 
adjudication. He notes that it is true that the pragmatic judge does not feel 
any special duty to follow past precedent: “The pragmatist values continuity 
with past enactments and decisions, but because such continuity is indeed a 
social value, not because he feels a sense of duty to the past.”47 This does 
not imply that the pragmatist will simply do whatever she pleases, without 
any respect for precedent. Rather, “[l]egal pragmatism is forward-looking, 
regarding adherence to past decisions as a (qualified) necessity rather than 
as an ethical duty.”48 Posner correctly contends that the pragmatist has 
instrumental reasons for adhering to precedent. Failure to follow precedent 
will undermine the stability of the legal system, which depends upon 
predictability and fairness (understood as treating like cases alike).49 
 
45. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 161 (1986). 
46. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 27, at 44. 
47. POSNER, supra note 6, at 71. 
48. Id. at 60. 
49. Of course, it is still no easy matter to determine whether or not a precedent applies along 
the formalist model. One has to determine that the present facts are similar in the relevant way to 
the facts of the past case, and there can be, therefore, great difficulties in predicting the action of 
the courts even if they maintain a staunch commitment to taking precedent seriously. 
SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC 12/8/2003 12:00 PM 
2003] Radical Pragmatism 695 
Moreover, past decisions may helpfully inform our present investigations. 
Thus, Dworkin and other critics of pragmatic adjudication fail to recognize 
that the pragmatist has good reasons to respect precedent. 
Further, Posner argues that “[p]ragmatic adjudication is not, as its 
ill-wishers charge, a synonym for ad hoc decisionmaking, that is, for always 
deciding a case in the way that will have the best immediate 
consequences . . . . Such an approach would be unpragmatic in disregarding 
the adverse systemic consequences of ad hoc adjudication.”50 In other 
words, concludes Posner, “‘[s]hortsighted’ is not part of the definition of 
‘pragmatic.’”51 
Nevertheless, despite Posner’s dispute with critics such as Dworkin, it 
turns out that they all share an impoverished notion of pragmatism rooted in 
a similar mistake. After Posner refutes the argument that judges should 
respect precedent for its own sake, he then goes too far in the other 
direction. He argues that “[t]he past is a repository of useful information, 
but it has no claim on us. The criterion for whether we should adhere to past 
practices is the consequences of doing so for now and the future.”52 
Posner’s insistence that the past has no claim on us is problematic, 
especially in our constitutional democracy. It conjures up images of the 
judge arriving on a scene armed with a storehouse of “facts” from the past, 
and then rendering her choice in light of whatever ends she has in mind. 
The origin of these ends apparently does not need to be accounted for. 
Dworkin has a valid criticism when he argues that, for adjudication in a 
constitutional democracy, these ends do need to be accounted for. Thus, 
both Posner and Dworkin view the pragmatist judge as deciding according 
to unjustified ends. 
Although Posner does recognize that the pragmatic judge must 
determine which consequences “are good and which bad, let alone how 
much weight to place on each consequence,” and that “goodness and 
badness are to be determined by reference to human needs and interests,” 
he also suggests that “nothing in consequentialism or pragmatism helps to 
determine them.”53 Therefore, “different judges, each with his own idea of 
the community’s needs and interests, will weigh consequences 
differently.”54 The solution is thus a diverse judiciary because “[s]uch a 
judiciary is more representative, and its decisions will therefore command 
 
50. POSNER, supra note 6, at 60. Margaret Radin offers a critique of Dworkin along similar 
lines. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND 
SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 127, 145-47. 
51. POSNER, supra note 6, at 60. 
52. Id. at 6. 
53. Id. at 71. 
54. Id. 
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greater acceptance in a diverse society than would the decisions of a 
mandarin court.”55 
If pragmatism cannot help us assess the goodness and badness of our 
ends, then it seems fair to say that the pragmatist simply accepts (or 
inherits) her ends uncritically. This reduces the contribution of pragmatism 
to merely aiding the selection of means to achieve particular ends. When 
asked about which ends to choose, Posner has nothing to say.56 For him, 
pragmatism is value-neutral and “has no moral compass.”57 As Posner has 
stated time and again, pragmatism has “no inherent political valence.”58 The 
notion that pragmatism is neutral hearkens back to William James, who 
wrote that pragmatism “stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, 
and no doctrines save its method.”59 
This account of pragmatism is shared by many neopragmatists as well 
as their critics. For example, Brian Tamanaha has stated that “pragmatism 
is empty of substance,” and he contends that “[p]ragmatism does not say 
what the good is, how to live, what economic or political system to develop, 
or anything else of that nature.”60 Lynn Baker’s critique of the pragmatism 
of Richard Rorty goes even further, suggesting that contemporary 
pragmatism not only lacks substance, but is also merely an exhortation to 
privilege action over theory: “In the end, pragmatism appears to be useful 
in achieving progressive social change to the extent that one profits from 
statements such as, ‘There is no method or procedure to be followed except 
courageous and imaginative experimentation.’ Or, as the Nike people say, 
‘Just do it.’”61 
It is this account of pragmatism that Dworkin critiques, and rightly so. 
Dworkin is correct that we must justify the legitimacy of the ends we select 
to guide our adjudication. Since citizens do not vote on every issue, and 
 
55. Id. at 120 (footnote omitted). 
56. See id. at 105-06.  
57. Id. at 55. 
58. Id. at 84; see also POSNER, supra note 19, at 393.  
59. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 54 
(1907).  
60. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative 
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 328 
(1996). 
61. Baker, supra note 27, at 718 (quoting Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 
MICH. Q. REV. 231, 242 (1991)), reprinted in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 3, 
at 115. In another example of this critique, Alan Ryan, in his New York Times review of Law, 
Pragmatism, and Democracy, concludes that Posner’s “argument is an elegant illustration of what 
is lost by Pragmatism’s abandonment of principle.” Alan Ryan, The Legal Theory of No Legal 
Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 7, at 20. In Coleman’s recent examination of pragmatism 
(on a point where we believe that Coleman’s pragmatism, indebted as it is to Quine and Sellars, 
also shares much with Dewey), he aptly recognizes the tight relationship between pragmatism and 
principle that belies Ryan’s critique. Coleman writes: “In saying that pragmatism recognizes 
explanation by embodiment as a legitimate form of philosophical explanation of a practice, I mean 
that in certain kinds of practices, the inferential roles of concepts may be seen to hang together in 
a way that reflects a general principle.” COLEMAN, supra note 29, at 8. 
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since we are bound by a Constitution that circumscribes our ordinary 
lawmaking, it is important for judges to demonstrate the legitimacy of the 
principles, ends, and ideals they invoke. To do so, they need to explain at 
least two things: (1) why they believe that one set of ends provides a better 
account of our present practices and of who we are as a People, and (2) 
what the implications of that account are for addressing the present 
problems we face and our choices about who we as a People will become.62 
Dworkin’s concerns have merit, but his critique is misplaced when he 
speaks of pragmatism beyond Posner’s account. The inability of Posner’s 
pragmatism to respond effectively to this critique stems from Posner’s view 
of the relationship between theory and practice—as though “everyday” 
practice is somehow without theoretical dimensions. But as we argue 
below, pragmatism need not adopt this view, and hence, need not lead us to 
this dead end. 
B. Theory and Practice 
1. The Role of Philosophical Theory 
At the heart of Posner’s pragmatism is a particular understanding of the 
relationship between theory and practice. For Posner, theory has little to 
offer practice, and he has engaged in an ongoing quest to attack academic 
theorists. Posner is building on work from his 1999 book, The Problematics 
of Moral and Legal Theory,63 in which he attacked legal and moral theory, 
and his 2001 book, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline,64 in which he 
argued that public intellectuals are increasingly unhelpful in grappling with 
legal and policy issues. In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner uses 
his notion of everyday pragmatism to argue that whereas disciplines like 
economics, sociology, and biology are useful in the law, philosophy is more 
of a hindrance than a help. According to Posner, academics are insulated 
from the “real” world and tend to become easily infatuated with empty 
abstractions such as justice, fairness, and equality. Posner argues that 
“academic philosophy” is “a field that has essentially no audience among 
judges and lawyers—let alone among politicians—even when philosophy is 
taken up by law professors . . . who think it should influence law.”65 Legal 
pragmatists reject “abstract theorizing of which professors of constitutional 
 
62. See J.M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER 
L. SYMP. J. 167, 180 (1999) (“Constitutional stories constitute us as a people with a purpose and a 
trajectory: They remind us what we have done in the past and therefore what we should be doing 
today. They explain to us where we have been and therefore where we should be going.”). 
63. POSNER, supra note 28. 
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001). 
65. POSNER, supra note 6, at 11. 
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law are enamored, in which decisions are evaluated by reference to 
abstractions common in law talk such as fairness, justice, autonomy, and 
equality.”66 Further, Posner argues, when pragmatists examine a 
constitutional issue, such as “whether per-pupil expenditures on public 
school education should be equalized across school districts,” the 
pragmatist avoids “question-begging vacuities (such as ‘equality’ and 
‘fundamental rights’).”67 “What sensible person,” he asks, “would be 
guided in such difficult, contentious, and fact-laden matters by a 
philosopher or his law-professor knock-off?”68 
One can understand Posner’s concerns. Much theoretical academic 
work participates in a private conversation far removed from the pressing 
social problems of the day. Philosophical discourse, whether in academic 
philosophy or in legal theory, can be overly abstract, filled with jargon, and 
disconnected from current practice. The result is an insular world in an 
ivory tower, where academics talk mostly among themselves, producing a 
parade of half-baked ideas and impractical suggestions for reform. 
In making this criticism, Posner echoes Dewey, who also staunchly 
criticized the academy for theorizing abstractly without attempting to 
connect theory to current practice. Dewey attacked theorizing that 
“becomes arbitrary, aloof—what is called ‘abstract’ when that word is used 
in a bad sense to designate something which exclusively occupies a realm 
of its own without contact with the things of ordinary experience.”69 Dewey 
criticized philosophy that attempted to treat itself as something more lofty 
than other forms of knowledge, as “a realm of higher Being” with “air purer 
than that in which exist the making and doing that relate to livelihood.”70 
Like Dewey, Posner is right to criticize academic theorists who view their 
theorizing as a higher and purer activity than disciplines that employ 
empirical methods of analysis. 
Dewey was very critical of academic departments for creating 
pseudoproblems—taking problems from general experience and converting 
them into philosophical puzzles with a life of their own, disconnected from 
their origins in experience.71 Philosophy should begin in ordinary life with 
 
66. Id. at 79. 
67. Id. at 79-80. 
68. Id. at 80. 
69. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 9 (Open Court Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1929) (1925), 
reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 3, 17. 
70. JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 14 (1929), reprinted in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE 
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 3, 11-12. 
71. See DEWEY, supra note 69, at 27-28, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 34 (“Empirical method finds and points to the operation of choice as 
it does to any other event. Thus it protects us from conversion of eventual functions into 
antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be the philosophic fallacy, whether it be 
performed in behalf of mathematical subsistences, esthetic essences, the purely physical order of 
nature, or God.”). 
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the concerns, pressures, and facts of contemporary existence.72 For Dewey, 
“Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with 
the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by 
philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.”73 Accordingly, Dewey 
believed a “first-rate test” of the value of any philosophy consists in its 
answer to this question: “Does it end in conclusions which, when they are 
referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render 
them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with 
them more fruitful?”74 
If a philosophy is to meet this challenge, it must take as its starting 
point the problems generated by our everyday practices. Likewise, a 
philosophy of law, as Dewey observes, “cannot be set up as if it were a 
separate entity, but can be discussed only in terms of the social conditions 
in which it arises and of what it concretely does there.”75 Thus, as a 
pragmatist, Posner is right to suggest that those interested in improving 
legal methods and procedures should not look to academic philosophy or 
law departments for ready-made answers. He is also right to insist that 
constructive solutions usually require in-depth investigations of the facts. 
Posner also astutely argues that work should be done in what he calls 
the “empirical lowlands.”76 As Posner observes, “The theoretical uplands, 
where democratic and judicial ideals are debated, tend to be arid and 
overgrazed; the empirical lowlands are fertile but rarely cultivated.”77 The 
uplands are thus theoretical discourses that ask questions about the nature 
of justice, equality, and the good. The lowlands are efforts to explore 
empirically the results of our social practices. It is one thing to argue about 
the justification for policies such as affirmative action by sparring over 
competing conceptions of fairness, but more important to the pragmatist is 
understanding the consequences of such rhetoric in practice.78 What results 
are produced by affirmative action policies? Posner, like Dewey, thinks that 
theoretically minded individuals concerned with questions of justice and the 
 
72. See JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 25-27 (1920), reprinted in 12 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, at 77, 94 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976). 
73. John Dewey, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE: 
ESSAYS IN THE PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE 3, 65 (1917), reprinted in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE 
WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 3, 46. 
74. DEWEY, supra note 69, at 9-10, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-
1953, supra note 11, at 18. 
75. John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN 
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 73, 77 (Julius Rosenthal Found., Northwestern Univ. ed., 1941), reprinted 
in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 115, 117. 
76. POSNER, supra note 6, at 3. 
77. Id. at 3-4. Despite this observation, Posner continues to produce work in the “theoretical 
uplands” that calls for more work in the lowlands. 
78. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE 
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 315-87 (2001) (discussing the empirical effects of affirmative 
action at FCC auctions). 
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like could accomplish much more by investigating these conceptions in the 
context of particular practices. Not only would they help to ameliorate 
present problems, but they would also be submitting their ideals to the test 
of experience. Indeed, law is an excellent field for the pragmatist since it 
provides a forum to investigate concretely the meaning of our ideals. 
But Posner then takes a wrong turn. He equates philosophy exclusively 
to the work of academic departments in universities, and then he rejects 
philosophy wholesale. The practice of philosophy, however, is much 
broader than the practice of professors in academic institutions, and even 
the philosophy of the academy is far from monochromatic. Whether 
someone is a philosopher is a function of the questions she asks and the 
writing she does, not whether she is employed by a philosophy department. 
Philosophy is not the exclusive domain of academic philosophers; rather, it 
is the development of intelligent, critical, and reconstructive methods for 
approaching the problems of lived experience. Philosophy is something that 
everyone does or at least can do, not an insular club that only those in the 
ivory tower can join. Therefore, although the academic practice of 
philosophy often can be overly technical and disengaged from the problems 
of society, this does not imply that philosophy should be abandoned.79 
Posner’s account of pragmatism, as rejecting a role for philosophical 
theory, stems in part from a misunderstanding of the pragmatic 
 
79. Pragmatists like John Lachs have taken a different approach, based in part on a different 
understanding of the reasons for academic insularity. Lachs believes that the insularity is less a 
function of the subject matter that academics discuss, and more a function of institutional 
structures that reward and punish their behavior. Instead of concluding, as Posner does, that 
academic discussions are insular and therefore unimportant, he concludes that they are important 
but insulated. Accordingly, his recommendation is not to have the public ignore the academy, but 
rather to have the academy stop ignoring the public: 
If encouraging intellectuals to engage in public debate does not work, we may 
have to make it mandatory. . . . In the long run, intellectuals have to understand that 
they are on the payroll of the community in order, among other things, to warn us about 
our ways, to help us see our practices in perspective, to present arguments against what 
we are bent on doing, and, again and again, to present interesting alternatives. Their job 
is to shake up state and institutional orthodoxies, instead of working to preserve them. 
JOHN LACHS, A COMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUALS 8-9 (2003). 
In fact, even in the academy there have been considerable reconstructive projects involving 
the environment, health, art, education, politics, and to a lesser extent, law. E.g., LARRY 
HICKMAN, JOHN DEWEY’S PRAGMATIC TECHNOLOGY (1992) (developing the basis for a 
pragmatic criticism of modern approaches to understanding technology); RICHARD SHUSTERMAN, 
PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS: LIVING BEAUTY, RETHINKING ART (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) 
(1992) (exploring how pragmatist conceptions of aesthetics provide for richer imaginative and 
critical relationships to present art forms); BETH J. SINGER, PRAGMATISM, RIGHTS, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1999) (developing the implications of a theory of rights within a pragmatist 
tradition); SHANNON SULLIVAN, LIVING ACROSS AND THROUGH SKINS: TRANSACTIONAL 
BODIES, PRAGMATISM, AND FEMINISM (2001) (developing Dewey’s notion of “transaction” and 
its consequences for understanding gender); Glenn McGee, Pragmatic Method and Bioethics, in 
PRAGMATIC BIOETHICS 27 (Glenn McGee ed., 1999) (arguing that reconstructing the classic 
theory/practice dualism in the context of bioethics will enable recognition of the lack of neutrality 
of the bioethicist, “a community member who is intractably involved and invested and has 
particular interests”). 
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reconstruction of the theory/practice relationship. Under the traditional 
model of the theory/practice relationship, philosophical theory is seen as 
offering a foundation for practice. One should learn the theory and then put 
it into practice. But pragmatists, such as Dewey, never expected theory to 
guide practice in this way and never pretended that practice was 
independent of theory. Rather than embrace this dualism, the classical 
pragmatists sought to make practice more intelligent and more critical, in 
part by recognizing its theoretical dimension. This does not require 
theoretical reason capable of determining its goals outside of historical 
practices; rather it requires a critical and reconstructive approach to social 
institutions and practices. As Thomas Grey notes, “[T]hought always comes 
embodied in practices—culturally embedded habits and patterns of 
expectation, behavior, and response.”80 
Insofar as the language of “justice” has been dominated by Kantian 
moralists who believe that our regulative ideals are the product of pure 
reason, then one can understand Posner’s reservations.81 Terms like 
“justice” and “freedom” are not backed up by reference to Platonic forms, 
but are the products of our human experience and contested history.82 We 
don’t look to theory to tell us what “democracy,” “justice,” “equality,” and 
“freedom” mean. We look to our experience of past practices. Under this 
view, “theory” is a statement of the insights, often generalized, formed as a 
result of the success and failures of these practices. As Dewey observed, 
“[W]e institute standards of justice, truth, esthetic quality, etc., in order that 
different objects and events may be so intelligently compared with one 
 
80. Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND 
SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 9, 12. 
81. Dewey shared this concern: 
[M]any moral theories, some of them of considerable prestige in philosophy, have 
interpreted moral subject-matter in terms of norms, standards, ideals, which, according 
to the authors of these theories, have no possible factual standing. “Reasons” for 
adopting and following them then involve a “reason” and “rational” in a sense which is 
expressly asserted to be transcendent, a priori, supernal, “other-worldly.” 
John Dewey, Ethical Subject-Matter and Language, 42 J. PHIL. 701, 711 (1945), reprinted in 15 
JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 127, 139. 
82. As the person credited for the inception of American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, has 
pointed out, pragmatism has a theory of meaning that insists that to understand a concept is to 
understand the conceivable sensible effects of that concept. This does not mean one cannot use 
words such as “justice,” “fairness,” and “equality,” but that one must understand the meaning of 
the terms not by reference to Platonic forms, but by reference to the practical consequences they 
entail. CHARLES PEIRCE, How To Make Our Ideas Clear, in 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, 1867-1893, at 132 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992); 
see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 305 (1997) (“[P]ragmatism clearly has nothing against distinctions, definitions, 
coherence, abstract argument, or theoretical edifices: it is at least an open question whether or not 
these tools of the intellect are or are not useful for human purposes.”). 
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another as to give direction to activities dealing with concrete objects and 
affairs . . . .”83 
The risk with Posner’s antiabstraction strategy is that it silences 
meaningful community discussion. Terms such as “justice” and “equality” 
are not only used in the academy, but also are part of popular social 
discourse. Many people talk about intrinsic goods and understand freedom 
as the ability to fulfill their desires.84 Whereas Dewey offers us tools to 
reconstruct the meaning of these terms by giving priority to experience, 
Posner advises us to avoid the terms. The result may be that they remain to 
do mischief having been insulated from critical attention. 
By eliminating philosophical theorizing, Posner discards pragmatic 
tools for transforming existing institutions, customs, and social norms. 
Without a role for philosophical theorizing, Posner’s pragmatism looks less 
to opportunities for criticism and reconstruction of unsatisfactory practices, 
the two hallmarks of the Deweyan pragmatic approach,85 and more to 
opportunities for affirmation and acquiescence to the status quo. Such an 
account of pragmatism leads critics such as David Luban to conclude that 
“[p]ragmatism represents in the arena of conceptual change what Burke 
represents in that of political change: a cautionary voice protesting those 
who seek to overthrow the amassed wisdom of generations on no better 
basis than the trifling speculations of philosophers.”86 
Because it rejects any way to discuss the selection of ends, Posnerian 
pragmatism has little choice but to accept uncritically the dominant ends of 
society. This result is rather ironic considering Posner’s claim that 
pragmatism has no political valence. Since Posner’s pragmatism lacks the 
tools to engage in more radical social reform, it becomes a rather 
conservative philosophy in the Burkean sense. It ends up inhibiting the 
kinds of philosophical inquiries necessary to question the status quo. 
Therefore, the effects of Posnerian pragmatism are anything but neutral. 
 
83. JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 216 (1938), reprinted in 12 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 1, 216-17. As Margaret Radin 
correctly argues, “[I]deal theory is also necessary, because we need to know what we are trying to 
achieve. In other words, our visions and nonideal decisions, our theory and practice, paradoxically 
constitute each other.” Radin, supra note 50, at 129. 
84. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Shocking the Conscience: Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and 
the Judiciary, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 675, 690 (1999) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 28) 
(“[M]oral conceptualism is an intellectual tumor that Posner would like to remove. But as with 
certain tumors, it is doubtful that we can excise every trace of these moral conceptions from the 
legal mind without fatally impairing vital functions.”). 
85. See John J. Stuhr, Democracy as a Way of Life, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE: PRAGMATIC ESSAYS AFTER DEWEY 37, 40 (John J. Stuhr ed., 
1993) (observing that for Dewey, “philosophy is inherently criticism and reconstruction” 
(citations omitted)). 
86. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 138 (1994). 
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2. Philosophical Theory and Ends 
Posner’s pragmatism fails to point us toward productive inquiries for 
resolving legal and policy issues, for these issues involve the choice of 
ends. In contrast to Posner’s account, Deweyan pragmatism provides for a 
more fruitful inquiry into our selection of ends. Under this account of 
pragmatism, unlike Posner’s, philosophy plays an essential role. Dewey 
sees philosophy as critical inquiry, which aims to unsettle status quo 
assumptions and then provide guidance for projects of social reconstruction. 
Dewey observed that we often act out of habit, which is “an 
ability . . . formed through past experience.”87 While we need habit in order 
to function, habit can restrict the “reach” of our intellect, and can “fix its 
boundaries.”88 
Social customs are aggregations of habits; they “persist because 
individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior 
customs.”89 The problem with customs is that they can be “inert” and can 
readily lead “into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and 
experiment.”90 Maintaining institutions without change can lead to social 
stagnation. The goal of philosophical inquiry is thus to make habits “more 
intelligent,” by which Dewey means “more sensitively percipient, more 
informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct 
and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current.”91 Rather 
than be controlled by habit and custom, we must strive toward the 
intelligent control of habit.92 This involves criticizing current institutions 
and finding ways to reconstruct them. Of course, Dewey observed, we 
cannot abandon our institutions, as this would lead to “chaos and anarchy”; 
rather, we must “make over these institutions so that they serve under 
changing conditions.”93 
As a pragmatist, Posner is wrong to shrug off the hard work of 
justifying the ends our legal system pursues. The pragmatist does have 
something to say about our ends. The pragmatist justifies her value 
commitments, in part, by analyzing their historical genesis. Guiding ideals 
 
87. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 66 (1922), reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: 
THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 4, 48. 
88. Id. at 172, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, 
at 121. 
89. Id. at 58, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, 
at 43. 
90. Id. at 64, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, 
at 47. 
91. Id. at 128, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, 
at 90. 
92. Id. at 20, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, 
at 17-18. 
93. John Dewey, Evolution and Ethics, 8 MONIST 321, 335 (1898), reprinted in 5 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE EARLY WORKS, 1882-1898, at 34, 48 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1967). 
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such as “fairness,” “justice,” and “freedom” must be critically examined by 
looking to past experience. Posner complains that such ideals are empty 
abstractions, useless for assisting us in decisions.94 Yet they are rendered 
useless not because they are abstractions, but because insufficient effort is 
made to critically explore their genesis and the consequences of their 
deployment in various contexts. 
Pragmatists are committed to finding substantive sustenance for their 
guiding ideals through experiential inquiry. This requires difficult historical 
investigation and interpretation.95 There is no guarantee that one account 
will emerge as superior to all others, although many accounts, upon careful 
investigation, are shown to be wanting. If a particular view of justice or 
democracy is to be favored, it should be favored because of its past 
consequences and in light of its anticipated future consequences. Those in 
disagreement over political ends need not refrain from invoking 
considerations of justice, freedom, equality, and democracy, but they must 
not let matters rest there. They must explain the experiential basis for their 
choices. Given an assessment of our past experiences and practices, why 
should we prefer an account of democracy that tries to increase the 
participation of all citizens? Alternatively, why should we prefer to 
minimize the participation of most citizens? This is the discussion that we 
need to have. 
The pragmatist need not be a shallow empiricist who has something to 
say about means but nothing much to say about ends. The pragmatist need 
not eschew philosophical theorizing or discussion of regulative ideals. Far 
from being a mere method that provides little guidance as to our normative 
ends, pragmatism facilitates philosophical debates about them in ways that 
avoid appealing to hollow abstractions. Pragmatism is thus an invitation to 
a different kind of debate, a debate that the Posnerian pragmatist ignores. 
Posner is mistaken, therefore, when he proposes that there is nothing 
useful to be done in terms of critically assessing our value commitments. 
He appears to view ends as little more than mere tastes. As a result, he does 
not seem to believe that discussion about our ends will be very fruitful. This 
is why Posner ultimately recommends a diverse judiciary; at least different 
ends can be represented, even if discussing them won’t lead us anywhere. 
If Posner simply treats the selection of ends as the product of a judge’s 
individual choice, those ends become insulated from critical scrutiny. 
Pragmatism, by contrast, demands the critical assessment of our ends. 
 
94. POSNER, supra note 6, at 76, 79-80. 
95. As James Gouinlock points out in his seminal study on Dewey’s philosophy of value, one 
consequence of Dewey’s naturalism is the recognition that ends are part of historical processes 
and must be investigated as such. See JAMES GOUINLOCK, JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY OF 
VALUE 81 (1972) (“[E]nds are always ends of a [historical] process. They are not discontinuous 
substances or events existing independently in nature.”). 
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Where did they come from? What conditions were they responding to? 
What have been the results? Who has benefited from their adoption? Who 
has suffered? Have they been democratically selected? 
As a result, the pragmatist would understand that any view of the best 
future must be informed by a view of who we are as a People—and this 
depends upon an interpretation of our history.96 As Justice Holmes correctly 
noted, the obligation to history is not a duty (as Dworkin would have it) but 
a necessity.97 Pragmatists recognize that ends are not ahistorical. Dewey 
noted that “personal desire and belief [are] functions of habit and 
custom.”98 We do not get our ends from some a priori source; they emerge 
from experience. And our values originate not just from our own 
experience, but from collective social experience, which has a long history 
and is embodied in our current habits, customs, and traditions. In this way, 
the past perpetuates itself; it has a hold on us.99 We cannot simply wipe the 
slate clean or assume a “tabula rasa in order to permit the creation of a new 
order.”100 We adopt the ends we do often because they are transmitted to us 
by our parents, education, and culture. Dewey argued that we must consider 
the history of any social end in both directions: its past and its future. “We 
must consider it with reference to the antecedents which evoked it, and with 
reference to its later career and fate.”101 We must look to the genesis of a 
particular end because 
[i]t arises in a certain context, and as a reaction to certain 
circumstances; it has a subsequent history which can be traced. It 
maintains and reinforces certain conditions, and modifies others. It 
becomes a stimulus which provokes new modes of action. Now 
when we see how and why the belief came about, and also know 
what else came about because of it, we have a hold upon the worth 
 
96. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 
1350 (1988) (“For a pragmatist the analysis must start—but not finish—with an examination of 
our constitutional text, history, and traditions.”). 
97. Holmes wrote: 
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it 
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it 
tends to become. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881). 
98. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 161-62 (1927), reprinted in 2 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 235, 336. 
99. Id., reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 336. 
100. Id. at 162, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, 
at 336. 
101. John Dewey, The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality (pt. 2), 11 PHIL. REV. 
353, 359 (1902), reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 
3, 26. 
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of the belief which is entirely wanting when we set it up as an 
isolated intuition.102 
Since ends do not emerge from a transcendent realm, the pragmatist 
should not simply accept her own ends uncritically. She must subject them 
to critical inquiry. According to Dewey, criticism occurs when we look “to 
see what sort of value is present” and “instead of accepting a value-object 
wholeheartedly . . . we raise even a shadow of a question about its 
worth.”103 This involves understanding the origins of our ends, the reasons 
for their existence, and whether these reasons warrant continued allegiance 
today. Through pragmatic criticism, we may discover that particular ends 
have merely survived through inertia or that the reasons for their existence 
no longer apply to our present situation.  
Therefore, to the extent that pragmatism is an “attitude,” it is one that is 
radical, for it is skeptical and experimental. The pragmatic temperament is 
one that is constantly prodding and questioning; it focuses on change and 
transformation. Although the pragmatist need not be committed to radical 
ends, she is committed to a radical kind of criticism and experimentation. 
This does not mean that pragmatism must reject the status quo, but it does 
mean that the pragmatist must be wary of accepting inherited ends 
uncritically. Far from being mundane and banal, pragmatism takes up the 
hard work of removing the blinders of existing habits, customs, and 
conventions by testing accepted beliefs and “truths.” The result of this 
attitude is a critical edge. 
C. The Implications of Legal Pragmatism 
In a number of examples sprinkled throughout the book, Posner 
attempts to demonstrate how his legal pragmatism works in practice by 
addressing specific legal and policy issues. Posner tackles a wide variety of 
topics, including Bush v. Gore and the 2000 election deadlock, the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal, antitrust law, Clinton v. Jones, judicial review, and 
liberty and security after September 11. In many instances, Posner claims 
that his conclusions are pragmatic, but this characterization becomes 
dubious when his reasoning is considered more carefully. In particular, we 
focus on his discussions of judicial review and liberty versus security.104 
 
102. Id., reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 26-
27. 
103. DEWEY, supra note 69, at 324, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-
1953, supra note 11, at 299. 
104. We have selected these discussions because Posner has discussed many of his other 
examples more extensively in other books. For example, Posner has discussed Bush v. Gore in 
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE COURTS (2001); antitrust law in RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); and 
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Posner attempts to reach legal and policy conclusions from his pragmatism, 
but it is too thin to justify his conclusions, and Posner often ends up 
contradicting his own pragmatic approach. In contrast, the alternative 
account of pragmatism we have developed in previous Sections suggests 
more productive forms of inquiry into these issues. Our goal is not to 
engage in a direct debate with Posner over his conclusions, even though we 
would probably reach different ones. Rather, we aim to critique the way 
that Posner goes about reaching his conclusions, his method of reasoning 
and analysis. 
1. Judicial Restraint Versus Judicial Activism 
Posner argues that an “implication for law of Dewey’s epistemology is 
that courts should either have no power to invalidate legislation or exercise 
it only in extreme circumstances, when faced by a law patently 
unconstitutional or utterly appalling.”105 This is the language of judicial 
restraint, and Posner is alluding to Justice Holmes’s famous “puke test,” 
which holds laws unconstitutional only when they are so despicable that 
they make one puke. For Posner, “By invalidating legislation, courts 
prevent political experimentation.”106 “In Dewey’s intellectual universe, 
invalidating a statute is not just checking a political preference. It is 
profoundly rather than merely superficially undemocratic . . . . It places 
expert opinion over the distributed intelligence of the mass of the people 
and prevents the emergence of the best policies through intellectual natural 
selection.”107 Thus, Posner argues that Deweyan pragmatists on their own 
terms must support judicial restraint. 
This conclusion is false, and the argument that leads to it is invalid. In 
contrast to Posner, who speaks in a generalized, ahistorical manner, the 
Deweyan pragmatist would be reluctant to conclude that judicial restraint, 
or any judicial style, would be better at all times and in every situation 
throughout history. Holmes judged at a different point during our history; 
perhaps in his time judicial restraint was a pragmatic response. But it 
certainly doesn’t mean that judicial restraint is always demanded by 
pragmatism. To justify judicial restraint, the pragmatist would examine why 
it is best at this particular point in our history. Ironically, just a few pages 
earlier in the book, Posner seems to recognize this point. He extols Chief 
Justice John Marshall as an exemplar of pragmatism in judging.108 Posner 
 
the Clinton scandal in RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999). 
105. POSNER, supra note 6, at 121. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 122. 
108. See id. at 86. 
SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC 12/8/2003 12:00 PM 
708 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 113: 687 
defends Marshall against attacks that he was too formalistic and relied more 
on rhetoric than reason.109 “‘Marshall created judicial review as a pragmatic 
response to the inevitable crisis over the role of the judiciary in the 
constitutional scheme.’”110 Marshall, whose judicial style certainly cannot 
be described as judicial restraint, nevertheless was pragmatic according to 
Posner because he had an “extraordinary fit with his times.”111  
If Posner is correct about Marshall, then it certainly does not follow that 
the pragmatist should favor judicial restraint over activism in principle. 
Instead, if Posner were to argue pragmatically for judicial restraint, he 
would need to justify why, based upon past experience and an analysis of 
our current problems, judicial restraint is the most appropriate response at 
this time in our history. In light of the analysis of Marshall, one would 
expect Posner to recognize that judicial restraint might not be appropriate in 
all contexts, for all cases. 
Posner seems to argue that since pragmatism advocates 
experimentation in general, legislative experimentation should receive 
deference from pragmatist jurists. But even if one were to accept such a 
commitment to experimentation at face value, it would not follow that 
judicial experimentation should be ruled out. Pragmatic experimentation 
has no less value when it is practiced by the judiciary, and Posner provides 
no reason why it should be limited merely to legislation. 
Beyond this, one must be careful not to turn a commitment to 
experimentation into its opposite. The claim of the classical pragmatists 
was that scientific methods work better for grappling with our problems 
than adherence to absolutes. It would be ironic to maintain an absolutist 
commitment to experimentation in the name of pragmatism. The fact that 
pragmatists recognize the experimental method’s virtues does not mean 
they endorse experimentation in all forms and contexts. The pragmatic 
commitment to experimentation, for example, doesn’t lead pragmatists to 
favor the Nazi experimentation on humans. Pragmatism is a commitment to 
an experimental method, one that keeps testing its conclusions in 
experience. It is not a commitment to experimentation for its own sake. 
Striking down a law, even one that is “experimental,” can still be a 
pragmatic response. For example, legislatures can fail to be democratic. As 
Posner himself recognizes, interest groups can have an overly strong 
influence on legislation.112 Or legislatures can fail to adopt the appropriate 
 
109. See id. at 92. 
110. Id. at 91 (quoting ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: 
PRAGMATISM AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 168 
(2000)). For a discussion of contemporary jurisprudential accounts of judicial review, see LIPKIN, 
supra. 
111. POSNER, supra note 6, at 92. 
112. Id. at 198. 
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means to achieve the stated end of a law.113 Judges, in part due to the 
relatively insulated nature of the judiciary, can subject laws to critical 
scrutiny when powerful lobbies seek to prevent legislatures from doing so. 
As one of us has written elsewhere, the judiciary has the potential “to make 
institutions more democratic and humane, to force officials to base their 
policies on the best empirical research of the day, to be guided by 
democratic values, to be more humble and skeptical of their own 
practices.”114 Additionally, Daniel Farber observes that “[f]or the 
pragmatist . . . the question of the advisability of judicial review turns on its 
usefulness for promoting a flourishing democratic society—democratic not 
just in the sense of ballot casting but also in the sense that citizens are in 
charge of the intelligent development of their lives.”115 Thus, both judicial 
activism and restraint can be pragmatic, even democratic, responses to the 
problems of the present.  
2. Liberty Versus Security 
Posner also applies his pragmatism to an extensive discussion of civil 
liberties and security.116 Posner contends that civil libertarians are 
unpragmatic when they treat “our existing civil liberties—protections of 
privacy, of the freedom of the press, of the rights of criminal suspects, and 
the rest—as sacrosanct and insisting therefore that the battle against 
international terrorism must accommodate itself to them.”117 Posner 
engages in a cost-benefit analysis between liberty and security, and 
concludes: “A pragmatist would say [civil liberties] should be curtailed to 
the extent that the beneficial consequences for the safety of the 
nation . . . outweigh the adverse impact on liberty.”118 Echoing Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Posner argues that although civil liberties should be 
“curtailed in time of war or other national emergency,” civil libertarians 
wrongly fear that this curtailment will serve as a “precedent in time of 
peace.”119 Posner writes: “The events of September 11 revealed the United 
States to be in greater jeopardy from international terrorism than had been 
 
113. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 28, at 596 (“The project of independent empirical inquiry is 
so inherently aggressive, and the likelihood that legislatures (especially state legislatures) have 
acted sloppily or irrationally is so great, that a pragmatist such as Posner might find it hard, in 
practice, to restrain himself from substituting his own judgment for that of the political branches 
by following the facts to their logical conclusion.”). 
114. Solove, supra note 20, at 1018. 
115. Farber, supra note 96, at 1347-48. 
116. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 292-321. 
117. Id. at 296. 
118. Id. at 298. 
119. Id. at 304.  
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believed by most people until then . . . . It stands to reason that such a 
revelation would lead to our civil liberties being curtailed.”120 
Posner seems to be suggesting that civil libertarians are unpragmatic 
because they adhere to rights as absolutes. Posner attacks a caricature of the 
civil libertarian argument, since many civil libertarians are pragmatists, not 
absolutists. Posner also attacks civil libertarians when they offer “historical 
examples of supposed overreactions to threats to national security.”121 In 
contrast, he argues that history reveals that government officials have 
“disastrously underestimated these dangers” rather than exaggerated 
them.122 He elaborates: 
Actually, the lesson of history is the opposite. Officialdom has 
repeatedly and disastrously underestimated these dangers—whether 
it is the danger of secession that led to the Civil War, or the danger 
of a Japanese attack on the United States that led to the disaster at 
Pearl Harbor, or the danger of Soviet espionage in the 1940s that 
accelerated the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
by doing so emboldened Stalin to encourage North Korea to invade 
South Korea in 1950, or the installation in 1962 of Soviet missiles 
in Cuba that precipitated the Cuban missile crisis, or the outbreaks 
of urban violence and political assassinations in the 1960s, or the 
Tet Offensive of 1968 in the Vietnam War, or the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 and subsequent taking of American diplomats 
hostage, or the catastrophe of September 11, 2001.123 
But these examples do not simply involve a tradeoff between liberty 
and security. They are failures of foreign intelligence or political judgment. 
The point of the civil libertarians is that the government has often 
overreacted in curtailing liberty in times of crisis. Posner’s examples 
involve the failure to anticipate security threats. Without demonstrating 
how curtailing liberty would have improved our ability to avert these 
events, Posner’s examples have little relevance. 
Posner then contends that to the extent that the government did 
overreact by curtailing liberty in times of crisis, we should not be 
concerned, since “[t]he curtailment of civil liberties in the Civil War, World 
War I (and the ensuing ‘Red Scare’), World War II, and the Cold War did 
not outlast the emergencies.”124 But curtailments of liberties harmed 
thousands of innocent citizens, sometimes quite severely. Just because the 
 
120. Id. at 298. 
121. Id. at 296. 
122. Id. at 298. 
123. Id. at 298-99. 
124. Id. at 304. 
SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC 12/8/2003 12:00 PM 
2003] Radical Pragmatism 711 
government eventually realizes it overreacted and apologizes doesn’t set 
everything right. Apologies are meaningful when they guide future action. 
In light of a history marred by frequent misguided responses to threats, 
a pragmatic response would counsel caution. For example, in the early 
years of J. Edgar Hoover’s reign over the FBI, from 1919 to 1920, the 
government rounded up over 10,000 suspected communists, many without 
warrants.125 In 1942, in the name of national security, the government 
rounded up around 120,000 people of Japanese descent living on the West 
Coast and imprisoned them in internment camps.126 In a series of cases, 
including Korematsu v. United States,127 the Court upheld the internment as 
constitutional under “most rigid scrutiny.”128 Few today would defend 
Korematsu, but Posner, who is candid and unafraid to take controversial 
positions, appears to support it. He asks: “If the Constitution is not to be 
treated as a suicide pact, why should military exigencies not influence the 
scope of the constitutional rights that the Supreme Court has manufactured 
from the Constitution’s vague provisions?”129  
The internment, however, has long been acknowledged to have been a 
terrible mistake. Even the United States government has formally 
apologized.130 Posner responds that we must be wary of lessons we draw 
from the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight; just because the government’s 
fears that Japanese Americans were engaged in dangerous acts of espionage 
later proved to be false does not mean that at the time of the internment the 
government was unjustified in taking action. But there was not much 
evidence to support the government’s claims that the internment was 
necessary or even that there was a significant threat posed by Japanese 
Americans. Given historical tendencies of racial prejudice and the dangers 
of making racial distinctions, the decision to carry out the internment 
should have been viewed with great skepticism, especially considering the 
fact that German Americans were not subjected to similar treatment. 
Instead of analyzing the facts, however, the Supreme Court simply deferred 
to the judgment of the government officials, accepting their claims about 
the danger posed by Japanese Americans without critical scrutiny and 
without demanding supporting evidence.131 Even if Posner is right to worry 
 
125. See CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 75-76, 83, 93 
(1991). 
126. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 38 (2001); see also Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese 
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). 
127. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
128. Id. at 216. 
129. POSNER, supra note 6, at 294. 
130. See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED (1982). 
131. The analysis of the Court in Korematsu was based in large part on the factual analysis in 
an earlier case, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In Hirabayashi, the Court 
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about the ease with which backward-looking criticism ignores the fears of 
the moment, this does not imply that we must affirm those fears as 
legitimate. 
In addition to the Red Scare and Japanese internment, the McCarthy-era 
hunt for communists during the 1950s has also been shown to have been a 
severe overreaction. Recently released transcripts of secret Senate hearings 
suggest that McCarthy may have deliberately misled the public about the 
threat.132 The anticommunist movement resulted in terrible harm to many 
individuals. Those exposed as communists faced retaliation in the private 
sector, with numerous journalists, professors, entertainers, and others fired 
from their jobs and blacklisted from future employment.133 Ellen Schrecker 
notes that federal agencies exaggerated “the danger of radicalism” because 
of the “desire to present themselves as protecting the community against the 
threat of internal subversion.”134 Historians also argue that the 
anticommunist movement was not merely a response to security concerns, 
but also a means for carrying out the right-wing agendas of opportunistic 
politicians.135 
The pragmatist seeks to avoid these mistakes from occurring again; she 
does not view them as inevitable. She studies the past to see if there are 
better ways to distinguish the true threats from the manufactured ones. In 
the past, government officials have seized upon fears of national security to 
pursue their own personal agendas and prejudices. At the very least, an 
examination of our history should make us more guarded and skeptical 
when the government seeks to eliminate liberty in the name of security. 
After September 11, the pattern appeared to be recurring. The 
government rounded up thousands of people, restricted attorney-client 
confidentiality, instituted military tribunals, secretly detained and 
interrogated people, and increased electronic surveillance.136 Posner, 
however, takes issue with those public intellectuals such as Bruce 
Ackerman, Jeffrey Rosen, Michael Dorf, Ronald Dworkin, and Jack Balkin 
who stepped forward to support civil liberties.137 He criticizes them for 
 
concluded that it “is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of [government officials’] 
action or substitute its judgment for theirs.” Id. at 93. 
132. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Transcripts Detail Secret Questioning in 50’s by 
McCarthy, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A1. 
133. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
DOCUMENTS 76-86 (1994); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The 
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13-71 
(1991). 
134. SCHRECKER, supra note 133, at 10. 
135. See, e.g., id. at 92-94. 
136. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 (2002).  
137. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 311-15. For the articles Posner critiques, see Bruce 
Ackerman, Don’t Panic, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 2002, at 15; Jack M. Balkin, Using Our 
Fears To Justify a Power Grab, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B15; Ronald Dworkin, The Threat 
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being unpragmatic because legal thinkers simply lack the expertise to 
understand international terrorism and to assess security risks adequately.138 
But instead of offering a pragmatic evaluation of the full range of 
consequences to these governmental actions, Posner merely states 
abstractly that “liberty” must be sacrificed to protect “security.”139 
Posner appears to assume that liberty and security must be mutually 
exclusive, an assumption that is far from correct. Historically, America has 
remained safe and secure despite its traditional support of civil liberties. 
Might our tradition of civil liberties contribute to our safety? Not only may 
curtailments of liberty bring us no greater security, but they also may lead 
to insecurity. The pragmatist would certainly entertain this question and 
would not be so fast to assume a dichotomous tradeoff between liberty and 
security. 
In fact, following the historical pattern in which Posner finds comfort, 
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice recently reported that the 
government overreacted after September 11 and improperly rounded up 
numerous individuals.140 For Posner, this does not present much of a 
problem, because overreaction is what normally happens in times of crisis. 
The pragmatist, unlike Posner, would not confuse explanation for excuse. 
Pragmatists would look to history and think about how we could better 
grapple with crises and the tendency to respond with misguided measures 
that often involve the use of racial and ethnic categories. 
D. Reconstructing Legal Pragmatism 
Posner presents pragmatism as a move away from abstract 
philosophical theorizing and toward common sense. In his view, 
pragmatism amounts to antifoundationalism coupled with a commitment to 
“reasonableness” and being “realistic.” Posner has attempted to strip 
pragmatism down to the bone, but in doing so he has distorted pragmatism 
to such an extent that it not only diverges from the ideas of the classical 
pragmatists, but runs counter to them. Posner’s rejection of philosophical 
theory renders his pragmatism unable to tell us anything about how to 
choose our ends. At most, then, Posnerian pragmatism can help us focus on 
selecting the most efficient means to achieve our given ends; it amounts to 
little more than an exhortation to be more empirical in assessing the 
 
to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44; Jeffrey Rosen, Holding Pattern: Why 
Congress Must Stop Ashcroft’s Alien Detentions, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 16; and 
Michael C. Dorf, What Is an “Unlawful Combatant” and Why It Matters, WRIT, Jan. 23, 2002, at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html. 
138. POSNER, supra note 6, at 316. 
139. Id. at 296-97. 
140. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Report Faults the Roundup of Illegal Immigrants After 9/11, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1. 
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efficiency of our means. But legal and policy issues often cannot be 
resolved without examining our ends. This is especially true with the kind 
of contentious public law issues that Posner often addresses. Posner reaches 
conclusions on these issues, but as we demonstrated, he does not reach 
them pragmatically—even on his own terms. 
The deficiencies of Posner’s pragmatism are caused in large part by his 
characterization of guiding ideals such as justice, equality, and freedom as 
mere empty abstractions, and his subsequent refusal to engage them. This is 
a form of the theory/practice dualism, and it ends up supporting a very 
conservative view of the everyday practices in which we engage, such as 
the appropriate distribution of opportunities and resources. In his zeal to 
attack insular academic philosophical theorizing in particular, Posner 
inexplicably rejects philosophical questioning about our guiding ideals in 
general. But everyday practices have a theoretical dimension; guiding ideals 
are internal to our practices, not transcendent abstractions. Posnerian 
pragmatism thus insulates existing practices from critical examination, 
inhibiting the ability to transform them. 
In doing so, Posner’s pragmatism departs dramatically from the 
pragmatic tradition championed by William James and John Dewey. 
Pragmatism does not reject a role for moral theorizing but recommends 
instead that we critically reconstruct our normative ideals by testing them in 
experience. The fact that ideals are not fixed absolutes but are subject to 
revision and change doesn’t expose the bankruptcy of ideals; nor does it 
mean that we should abandon any discussion of ideals or ends, since they 
are essential for guiding our inquiries and practices. It means instead that, 
as pragmatists, we must be willing to bring our ideals back down to earth, 
to recognize their origin in past experience, and to subject them to criticism 
and reconstruction as we employ them in present experience under changed 
circumstances. 
In this manner, pragmatism is not empty and devoid of substance. 
Pragmatism has substantive commitments that are not separable from 
method. In other words, no method of inquiry is neutral. All inquiry begins 
with a particular direction, some preconceived notion of what is being 
sought. Inquiry is thus not a wide open process that can lead anywhere. To 
embark on an inquiry (or to adopt a method of inquiry) is already to head in 
a particular direction. The starting points of pragmatic inquiry are certain 
critical stances toward the status quo. This does not mean that one must 
reject the status quo, but it requires an inquiry into certain assumptions and 
basic social institutions that Posner will not undertake. In the end, one of 
the consequences of Posner’s pragmatism is that it discourages 
understanding debate over social ends as a worthwhile critical activity, and 
therefore entrenches past results, insulating dominant social structures from 
criticism. 
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These points become more salient when Posner turns to using his 
pragmatism to justify a theory of democracy. As we demonstrate in Part II, 
Posner fails to show how his account of democracy follows from his 
pragmatism, and he ends up justifying his theory in profoundly unpragmatic 
ways. In contrast, we demonstrate the more fruitful and productive types of 
inquiry into democracy that pragmatism has to offer. 
II.  DEMOCRACY 
After articulating his account of pragmatism, Posner devotes the core of 
his book to discussing democratic theory. He contrasts two concepts of 
democracy, which he refers to as “Concept 1” and “Concept 2” democracy. 
Posner defines Concept 1 democracy, which is often called “deliberative 
democracy,” as “political democracy conceived of as the pooling of 
different ideas and approaches and the selection of the best through debate 
and discussion.”141 According to Posner, Concept 1 democracy views all 
legally competent adults as having an equal “moral right” to participate in 
societal governance.142 Citizens have the responsibility to be informed 
about the issues, engage in open-minded dialogue with other citizens, and 
“base [their] political opinions and actions (such as voting) on [their] honest 
opinion, formed after due deliberation, of what is best for society as a 
whole rather than on narrow self-interest.”143 
Among the Concept 1 theorists that Posner identifies are John Rawls, 
JKrgen Habermas, Cass Sunstein, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson.144 
The most notable Concept 1 theorist is John Dewey,145 who developed an 
extensive theory of democracy in many of his works, including The Public 
and Its Problems,146 Liberalism and Social Action,147 Individualism Old and 
New,148 Democracy and Education,149 and Freedom and Culture,150 as well 
as in numerous essays and portions of other books.151 
 
141. POSNER, supra note 6, at 106-07; see also id. at 130-31.  
142. Id. at 131. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 14; see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger 
trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996). 
145. POSNER, supra note 6, at 186. 
146. DEWEY, supra note 98, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, 
supra note 11, at 235. 
147. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: 
THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 1. 
148. JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW (1930), reprinted in 5 JOHN DEWEY: THE 
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 41. 
149. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916), reprinted in 9 JOHN DEWEY: THE 
MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 1. 
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In contrast to Concept 1, Posner advances an alternative notion of 
democracy, which he calls “Concept 2” democracy. Concept 2 democracy 
is based on Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of “elite democracy.”152 Concept 2 
democracy is representative democracy, in which the bulk of the population 
has little political involvement except for casting a vote every now and 
then. “Concept 2 rejects the idea that democracy is self-government. 
 
150. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939), reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE 
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 63. 
151. See JOHN DEWEY, SOC’Y FOR ETHICAL CULTURE, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION IN 
THE WORLD OF TODAY (1938), reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, 
supra note 11, at 294; John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in JOHN DEWEY 
& THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 12 (Progressive Educ. Ass’n, Progressive Educ. Booklet No. 14, 
1939), reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 224; John 
Dewey, Democracy in Education, 4 ELEMENTARY SCH. TCHR. 193 (1903), reprinted in 3 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 229; John Dewey, The Democratic 
Faith and Education, 4 ANTIOCH REV. 274 (1944), reprinted in 15 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER 
WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 251; John Dewey, The Need of an Industrial Education in 
an Industrial Democracy, in 17 MANUAL TRAINING & VOCATIONAL EDUC. 409 (1916), reprinted 
in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 137; John Dewey, A 
Liberal Speaks Out for Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 23, 1936, at 3, reprinted in 11 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 282; John Dewey, The Basic Values 
and Loyalties of Democracy, AM. TCHR., May 1941, at 8, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE 
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 275; John Dewey, The Challenge of Democracy to 
Education, PROGRESSIVE EDUC., Feb. 1937, at 79, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER 
WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 181; John Dewey, Education, Democracy, and Socialized 
Economy, SOC. FRONTIER, Dec. 1938, at 71, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 304; John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, SCH. & SOC’Y, Jan. 19, 
1935, at 73, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 289; 
John Dewey, Practical Democracy, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1925, at 52 [hereinafter Dewey, 
Practical Democracy] (reviewing WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925)), reprinted 
in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 213. 
This list is far from exhaustive. Oddly, of the vast amount of work Dewey devoted to his 
democratic theory, Posner focuses almost exclusively on The Public and Its Problems. In fact, 
Posner rarely cites to any other works by John Dewey except a few essays by Dewey in law 
reviews, such as, John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); and John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 
(1924). Even when discussing Dewey’s metaphysics, citations to Dewey’s most famous works—
such as Experience and Nature, The Quest for Certainty, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Human 
Nature and Conduct, and Reconstruction in Philosophy—are virtually nonexistent. The omission 
of Experience and Nature is particularly unusual, since this was a book Justice Holmes (one of 
Posner’s model judges) had read and praised very highly. Holmes “remarked that, though 
‘incredibly ill written,’ it had ‘a feeling of intimacy with the inside of the cosmos that I found 
unequaled. So methought God would have spoken had He been inarticulate but keenly desirous to 
tell you how it was.’” ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 341 
(1991) (quoting 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 1874-1932, at 287 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
1941)). 
152. POSNER, supra note 6, at 130. Posner cites Schumpeter as the central theorist of Concept 
2 democracy, but surprisingly does not comment upon Dewey’s debates with Walter Lippmann, 
who argued in favor of elitist conceptions of democracy using many of the same reasons Posner 
provides. See LIPPMANN, supra note 151; WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922). Dewey 
had numerous debates with Lippmann. See Dewey, Practical Democracy, supra note 151, 
reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 213; John Dewey, 
Public Opinion, 30 NEW REPUBLIC 286 (1922) (reviewing LIPPMANN, supra), reprinted in 13 
JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 337. For a discussion of these 
debates within the historical circumstances of the time, see WESTBROOK, supra note 151, at 
293-318. 
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Democracy is government subject to electoral checks.”153 Interest groups 
and elites run the show. “Successful [political] candidates are not random 
draws from the public at large. They are smarter, better educated, more 
ambitious, and wealthier than the average person.”154 
Despite its reliance on elites, Concept 2 democracy is populist, Posner 
argues, because it takes people as they are: Ordinary people simply don’t 
have the expertise or time to be engaged in a robust political life. “Concept 
2 is the democracy of interests and so of responsiveness to public opinion, 
to what people want as distinct from what political theorists think they 
should want or under different (better?) social or political conditions would 
want.”155 Therefore, the goal of Concept 2 democracy is that “the interests 
(preferences, values, opinions) of the population, whatever they may 
happen to be, be represented in government.”156 
Posner prefers Concept 2 democracy based on what he believes are 
pragmatic grounds. Concept 2 democracy, says Posner, is “the democracy 
of the pragmatists, more precisely of the everyday pragmatists.”157 To 
justify why Concept 2 is better from the standpoint of pragmatic theory, 
Posner makes two general arguments. 
First, he contends that Concept 2 is a “more accurate description of 
American democracy than Concept 1.”158 Posner criticizes Concept 1 
democracy as being too idealistic and elitist. Concept 1 democracy is not 
feasible; it is a utopian dream.159 It does not take people as they are; it 
wants people to be more educated, more concerned about politics, more 
civic-minded. Posner contends that Concept 2 is more realistic than 
Concept 1. Concept 2 is “unillusioned about democracy.”160 It “best 
describes the American political system today.”161 Concept 1 democracy 
“places expert opinion over the distributed intelligence of the mass of the 
people and prevents the emergence of the best policies through intellectual 
natural selection.”162 Concept 1 theorists “envision moral argument on 
political questions as taking place on a philosophical plane,”163 which is at a 
level of sophistication beyond the comprehension of most American 
citizens. In short, Concept 1 democracy is modeled on “a faculty 
workshop.”164 
 
153. POSNER, supra note 6, at 164. 
154. Id. at 154. 
155. Id. at 165. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 143. 
158. Id. at 130. 
159. See id. at 164-65. 
160. Id. at 145. 
161. Id. at 147. 
162. Id. at 122. 
163. Id. at 132. 
164. Id. at 143. 
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In contrast, Concept 2 does not have a “preconceived, idealized model 
of democracy to which to compare the practice of American or any other 
existing democracy.”165 Concept 2 “is inclined to take for granted the 
features of democratic practice lamented by Concept 1 democrats.”166 To 
sum up, “Concept 1 democracy” is “loftier,” “idealistic, theoretical, and 
top-down,”167 whereas “Concept 2 democracy” is “realistic, cynical, and 
bottom-up”—it is “pragmatic.”168 
Second, Posner argues that Concept 2 is “normatively superior” to 
Concept 1.169 Concept 2 enables people to pursue their private interests 
without being overly sidetracked; it allows the more educated experts 
to run the show; it maintains a firm political stability; and it enables 
the public to check the governing elites if they completely ignore the 
public’s interests.170 “Democracy as pictured by Concept 2 democrats is not 
self-rule. It is rule by officials who are, however, chosen by the people and 
who if they don’t perform to expectations are fired by the people at the end 
of a short fixed or limited term of office.”171 
Since Posner justifies his choice of Concept 2 democracy based on 
pragmatism, he attempts to explain why Dewey, one of the leading 
pragmatic theorists, chose Concept 1. Posner argues that Dewey’s views of 
democracy are entirely separate from his pragmatic ideas. Thus, Posner 
contends, Dewey’s political views “have no organic relation to his 
philosophy” and belong instead “to his career as a public intellectual.”172 
This move is essential for Posner, because Posner accepts many of Dewey’s 
pragmatic ideas yet eschews Dewey’s liberal political philosophy. 
According to Posner, Dewey’s faith in deliberative democracy was 
misplaced, for Dewey wanted people “to think about political questions the 
way scientists think about scientific ones—disinterestedly, intelligently, 
empirically,” but he “succumbed to the intellectual’s typical mistake of 
exaggerating the importance of intellect and of associated virtues such as 
commitment to disinterested inquiry.”173 A pragmatist, Posner concludes, 
should embrace Concept 2 because it is more realistic and practical than 
Concept 1, and because it works better. 
Posner’s account of democracy is deeply flawed on many levels. More 
importantly for Posner’s project, his account of democracy is not pragmatic 
at all—even on Posner’s own terms. Moreover, although Dewey’s specific 
 
165. Id. at 162. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 130. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 182. 
171. Id. at 144. 
172. Id. at 98. 
173. Id. at 107-08. 
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views of democracy and particular instantiations of Concept 1 democracy 
may not ineluctably follow from Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, this does 
not mean that pragmatism is neutral toward whatever concept of democracy 
or theory of political governance one might adopt. On the contrary, there is 
an organic relation between Dewey’s political views and his philosophy, for 
his politics arises from the results of his pragmatic inquiry. 
A. The Possibility of Democratic Deliberation 
Posner’s justification of Concept 2 democracy begins with a descriptive 
argument that Concept 1 is idealistic and unattainable. Posner thinks he is 
being pragmatic in his assessment of Concept 1, and uses his descriptive 
argument that Concept 1 is unrealistic to buttress his normative choice for 
Concept 2. “The big difference is that Concept 2, because of its greater 
realism, provides a stronger framework for appraisal of practical 
improvements in our democratic system.”174 Posner’s logic is as follows: 
Since Concept 2 is realistic, and since it more accurately describes the 
status quo than Concept 1, Concept 2 is thus superior. But this logic has 
numerous flaws. First, just because Concept 2 is more easily attained or 
more reflective of the dominant ideals in the status quo doesn’t make it 
more desirable. Second, Posner appears to set up a false dichotomy between 
Concept 1 and Concept 2, as if these are the only choices. The pragmatist 
would find this quite ironic, since pragmatists, especially Dewey and 
James, criticized starting out with overly narrow sets of choices.175 Even if 
Concept 1 is in fact unattainable, this does not warrant selecting Concept 2 
unless it is the only remaining choice. 
Nevertheless, Posner’s critique about the plausibility of Concept 1 does 
have important implications. Regardless of the merits of Concept 2, the 
unattainability of Concept 1 may be grounds to reject it. On Posner’s 
account, “advocates of Concept 1 ask for the moon.”176 And because of this, 
most Concept 1 theorists are profoundly disappointed when they discover 
that people are not sufficiently civic-minded and politically informed: “The 
theorist of deliberative democracy prescribes conditions of knowledge, 
attention, and public-spiritedness that the people cannot or will not satisfy 
in their political life.”177 In short, Posner’s argument is that the pragmatist is 
too sober and realistic to be fooled by the idealistic illusions behind 
Concept 1. 
 
174. Id. at 248. 
175. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in THE WILL TO 
BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 184, 206-08 (New York, Longmans, 
Green & Co. 1897). 
176. POSNER, supra note 6, at 188. 
177. Id. at 157. 
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This argument basically consists of two claims. The first is a claim 
about human capacity and potential. People are not (and will never be) 
civic-minded in the way Concept 1 proponents want them to be. Second, 
Posner argues that democratic deliberation as Concept 1 envisions is 
impossible. Posner believes both of these arguments are pragmatic. In our 
discussion below we provide an alternative view that challenges this 
account. We suggest that conclusions about human capacity are premature 
in light of the insufficiency of present efforts to engage individuals and 
groups in wide-ranging community debate. We also argue that pragmatic 
democracy depends upon such efforts. 
1. Human Capacity and Potential 
John Dewey observed that all social and political philosophies “involve 
a certain view about the constitution of human nature.”178 Posner’s 
democratic theory is founded upon a very cynical understanding of human 
nature. His view of human nature becomes apparent in his critique of 
Concept 1 democrats, whom Posner strongly chastises for being too 
idealistic about the capabilities of American citizens to engage in 
meaningful public discourse. According to Posner, in reality, “[t]he United 
States is a tenaciously philistine society. Its citizens have little appetite for 
abstractions and little time and less inclination to devote substantial time to 
training themselves to become informed and public-spirited voters.”179 
Posner contends that political issues are becoming too complicated and 
numerous for the public to understand them.180 Moreover, people are 
increasingly apathetic and uninterested in politics: “[E]ven people who 
bother to vote often lack much interest in or knowledge of the issues and 
candidates.”181 For Posner, most people are selfish and individualistic: 
“[M]ost citizens are interested not in what is best in some sense for the 
nation or the world but rather in what is best from the standpoint of their 
self-interest.”182 
Posner claims that most Concept 1 theorists recognize these limitations 
on human nature and thus are bound to fall into despair: “Concept 1 
democrats are thus in a bind. Realism requires them to prefer representative 
to direct democracy. But realism teaches that elected representatives cannot 
be depended on to deliberate in the public interest. Realism is Concept 2 
democracy.”183 
 
178. DEWEY, supra note 150, at 13, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-
1953, supra note 11, at 72.  
179. POSNER, supra note 6, at 164. 
180. Id. at 151. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 192-93. 
183. Id. at 154. 
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This sort of “realism,” however, is not consistent with Posner’s other 
statements about pragmatism. Posner notes that pragmatists understand that 
all knowledge is local and perspectival. In The Problems of Jurisprudence, 
Posner states that he embraces pragmatism because it recognizes the 
“‘localness’ of human knowledge” and “the consequent importance of 
keeping diverse paths of inquiry open.”184 In The Problematics of Moral 
and Legal Theory, Posner notes that “doubt rather than belief is the spur to 
inquiry; and doubt is a disposition that pragmatism encourages, precisely in 
order to spur inquiry.”185 In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner 
claims that pragmatism is antifoundationalist and that “[w]e cannot hope to 
know the universe as it really is.”186 
If knowledge is local and perspectival, however, then the pragmatist 
cannot simply begin uncritically with the “facts.” Posner’s pragmatist is 
skeptical about theory, but not about facts. But although Dewey and other 
pragmatists argued that philosophy begins with problems in experience, this 
does not mean that we should always take these perceived problems at face 
value. We must be critical about how we assess the facts of a situation.187 
Facts, Dewey observed, “are not self-sufficient and complete in themselves. 
They are selected and described . . . for a purpose.”188 The “facts” are 
selected based on our interests and in response to particular problems in 
experience. What we perceive as a “fact” is related to our purposes. 
Posnerian pragmatism is skeptical about theory because it is infused with 
ideology, yet facts also deserve scrutiny given the nature of their selection. 
When Posner’s realism is applied to human nature, he views human 
capabilities as having fixed limitations. For example, Posner writes: “Like 
populists, [pragmatists] take people as they find them; anything else would 
be unrealistic.”189 He states that “Concept 1 democracy is unworkable. It 
hopelessly exaggerates the moral and intellectual capacities, both actual and 
potential, not only of the average person but also of the average official 
(including judge) and even of the political theorists who seek to tutor the 
people and the officials.”190 This leads Posner to conclude that reforms to 
increase political deliberation are not feasible.191 
Posner’s conception of human nature becomes even more evident when 
he writes about Schumpeter’s view that 
 
184. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990). 
185. POSNER, supra note 28, at 264. 
186. POSNER, supra note 6, at 5. 
187. See DEWEY, supra note 69, at 31-32, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 38; DEWEY, supra note 83, at 70-71, reprinted in 12 JOHN DEWEY: 
THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 76. 
188. DEWEY, supra note 83, at 113, reprinted in 12 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-
1953, supra note 11, at 116. 
189. POSNER, supra note 6, at 155. 
190. Id. at 144. 
191. Id. at 163. 
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society is composed of wolves and sheep. The wolves are the 
natural leaders. They rise to the top in every society. The challenge 
to politics is to provide routes to the top that deflect the wolves 
from resorting to violence, usurpation, conquest, and oppression to 
obtain their place in the sun.192 
Posner goes on to state that “Schumpeter’s theory of democracy is realistic 
in its recognition that these people exist, that they will be the rulers 
whatever the structure of government.”193 Posner chastises Concept 1 
democrats for failing to realize this: “What Plato failed to recognize in 
urging that philosophers should be the kings, and what Plato’s descendants 
among deliberative democrats fail to recognize in urging government by 
discussion, is that a political system that does not enable the natural rulers 
to rule cannot survive.”194 
The view that everyone in society can be categorized into “wolves” and 
“sheep” is remarkably reductive. Posner offers no sociological or empirical 
support for this conclusion. It is apparently part of the Posnerian 
metaphysics that human beings are inherently one of these two types. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Posnerian pragmatist has taken a strong 
position in the nature versus nurture debate, concluding that nature wins all 
the time. In Posner’s view, society doesn’t help shape who becomes wolves 
or sheep; the wolves are born wolves and the role of society is to treat them 
accordingly. 
It is far from a truism, however, that a person is simply born a “wolf” or 
a “sheep.” Even if one were to employ this dichotomy, one would expect 
that which people turn out to be the wolves would depend on the structure 
of a given society. Posner talks about “natural leaders,” but this way of 
talking implies that there is a particular leadership skill, a view that has 
much more in common with the Platonism Posner rejects.195 It seems much 
more likely that the skills that contribute to effective leadership in a 
particular society will vary greatly with its makeup and history. In fact, 
earlier on in the book Posner points out that the skills of a successful judge 
are not universal qualities that work in all situations, but rather particular 
qualities that work well at a given time and place:  
 
Pragmatists, whose orientation is historicist rather than timeless, 
will reject [the] view that the qualities of a good judge are 
historically constant. It was the extraordinary fit between [Justice 
John] Marshall’s suite of qualities and the volatile historical setting 
 
192. Id. at 183. 
193. Id. at 184. 
194. Id. 
195. See id. at 30 (“The simplest definition of pragmatism is that it is the rejection of 
Platonism root and branch.”). 
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in which he worked that mainly explains his success and his 
greatness.196 
 
Pragmatically, it makes little sense to talk about “natural” leaders. Why 
can a society not survive if it fails to allow the “natural rulers” to rule? If 
the point is that some are, by nature, fit to rule and some are not, then on 
what empirical basis does this conclusion rest? On the surface, this claim 
has more of the ring of Plato’s noble lie, which classifies people into three 
natural types,197 than of a pragmatic investigation of the consequences of 
different social treatment of individuals with particular character traits. If 
the point is that some people are so willful and self-interested that they will 
derail the larger social structure if not made leaders, then the claim seems 
patently false. We have many mechanisms of social control and a wide 
variety of rewards and punishments to prevent dissatisfied individuals from 
harming society. One would expect Posner as pragmatist to argue instead 
that people with different traits would be effective rulers at different times, 
depending on the makeup of the society in which they live. 
Ironically, Posner seems to place his view of human nature in the 
mouths of Concept 1 theorists, whom he views as elitist: 
From the perspective of many (of course not all) of the faculty of 
those departments, the average voter is ignorant, philistine, 
provincial, selfish, excessively materialistic, puritanical (or 
libertine—depending on which end of the political spectrum the 
faculty member making the judgment occupies), superficial, vulgar, 
insensitive, unimaginative, complacent, chauvinistic, superstitious, 
uneducable, benighted politically, prone to hysteria, and 
overweight.198 
Posner writes as if only the Concept 1 democrats are elitist and as if this 
charge doesn’t apply to his advocacy for Concept 2. But he seems to 
assume as true the vision of the American people he attributes to Concept 1. 
Whereas Concept 1 democrats may lament the fact that many voters do not 
rise to their ideals, they nevertheless recognize that the voters have the 
potential to be civic-minded and intelligent. Posner seems to deny even this. 
Posner claims that “Concept 2 is thus more respectful of people as they 
actually are.”199 But what are people “actually”? For Dewey, people are not 
fixed entities, but a growth process occurring over an entire lifespan.200 The 
 
196. Id. at 92. 
197. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 93-94 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 2d ed. 1991). 
198. POSNER, supra note 6, at 155-56. 
199. Id. at 165-66. 
200. DEWEY, supra note 69, at 224-25, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 210. 
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individual, observes Dewey, is not “something complete, perfect, finished, 
an organized whole of parts united by the impress of a comprehensive 
form,” but is “something moving, changing, discrete, and above all 
initiating instead of final.”201 Dewey observes that only certain “innate 
needs,” such as those for food and drink are unchangeable.202 And even 
these needs are fixed only in the most general sense, for “what kinds of 
food are wanted and used are a matter of acquired habit influenced by both 
physical environment and social custom.”203 Defenders of the status quo 
have often wrongly asserted that social reform is impossible because human 
nature cannot be changed. For example, Dewey notes that Aristotle viewed 
slaves as having “an inherently slavish nature” and “would have regarded 
efforts to abolish slavery from society as an idle and utopian effort to 
change human nature where it was unchangeable.”204 Pragmatists like 
Dewey are open-minded about human nature, viewing it experimentally, as 
something that is growing and changing. Viewing human nature as fixed 
“diverts attention from the question of whether or not a change is desirable 
and from the other question of how it shall be brought about.”205 
While many Americans do not rise up to the ideals of Concept 1 
theorists, it is not clear that Posner paints an accurate picture of the 
American people. The reality is far more complex. On certain issues, people 
may be provincial and selfish, but on others they may be more 
civic-minded. Unpragmatically, Posner grounds his conception of human 
nature in a set of ipse dixits supported only by his own speculative 
judgments and intuitions.206 
 
201. Id. at 177, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, 
at 167; see also DEWEY, supra note 87, at 139-40, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE 
WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 97. 
202. John Dewey, Does Human Nature Change?, 52 ROTARIAN 8, 8 (1938), reprinted in 13 
JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 286, 286. 
203. Id. at 9, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 
287. 
204. Id., reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 
287. 
205. Id. at 59, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, 
at 293. As Robin West writes,  
The early liberals’ greatest substantive mistake, Dewey charged, was a direct 
consequence of this methodological failure to see that their vision of human nature and 
their definition of the good life were derived from the historically contingent conditions 
against which they perceived the individual as embattled: social and legal restraints on 
the alienability of labor, land, and commodities and legal and political inequalities of 
status. 
Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 673, 696-97 (1985). 
206. We are not the first to critique Posner for failing to practice what he preaches. See Linda 
E. Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality, 
31 N.M. L. REV. 455, 457-58 (2001) (“[Posner’s] writings repeatedly emphasize the need for 
judicial self-restraint, deference to other branches of government, and the prudence of generally 
following precedent, but his own judicial practice can exhibit lack of restraint and an unwarranted 
arrogation of power. His use of empirical data can be undisciplined, and his opinions sometimes 
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To the extent that the American people are apathetic toward political 
issues, the pragmatic response is not to view their apathy as an immutable 
reality. Political apathy is not an innate quality in human nature but a 
product of social institutions. Pragmatists seek to understand the way that 
the structure of American political life has influenced how people 
participate. Instead of taking the current “reality” as a given, pragmatists 
would experiment with different means to enhance the meaningfulness of 
political participation. Lack of political engagement may not stem from an 
inherent disinterest in politics; it might stem from a lack of avenues for 
participating meaningfully in public life. A pragmatic approach would 
focus on the future and recognize the need to create conditions for people to 
become engaged.207 
2. Democratic Deliberation 
Beyond his bleak, deterministic, and unpragmatic account of human 
nature, Posner also makes another (so-called) pragmatic argument for the 
conclusion that Concept 1 is doomed. According to Posner, democratic 
deliberation is impossible. He contends that “sober proponents of Concept 1 
democracy realize that deliberation is not effective in bridging fundamental 
disagreements.”208 Moreover, Posner argues, “debates over moral and 
political philosophy are notoriously inconclusive—I would go further and 
call them indeterminate and interminable—and in any event far above the 
head of the average, or for that matter the above-average, voter.”209 
Therefore, Posner concludes, “[o]nly intellectuals believe . . . that 
discussion can resolve deep political or ideological conflicts.”210 
Why can’t people engage in meaningful dialogue? One reason, Posner 
posits, is religion: “Since so many Americans . . . are religious, and 
religious belief is a showstopper so far as public debate in our society is 
concerned, it is doubtful that deliberation over fundamental political goals 
and values is feasible outside our leading universities, the ethos of which is 
secular.”211 But this conclusion is not obvious. Many individuals with deep 
 
range well beyond the issues that are before the court.”); Ravitch, supra note 28, at 974-75 
(critiquing Posner for failing to carefully analyze data and basing his analysis on unanalyzed 
assumptions); Rosen, supra note 28, at 601 (noting that Posner’s pragmatism is unpragmatic). 
207. For example, the work of Paul Schwartz examines how “cyberspace has a tremendous 
potential to revitalize democratic self-governance at a time when a declining level of participation 
in communal life endangers civil society in the United States.” Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1610-11 (1999). Schwartz argues that the 
realization of the democratic potential of the Internet depends in part on the protection of privacy 
online. Schwartz’s work thus provides an example of a future-oriented focus on the ways in which 
we can guide new technologies in enhancing self-government. 
208. POSNER, supra note 6, at 135. 
209. Id. at 133. 
210. Id. at 138. 
211. Id. at 137. 
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religious commitments participate in political debates (e.g., Martin Luther 
King, Jr.). Just because people are religious does not mean that they will be 
unable to find common ground with others for the purposes of many 
political discussions.212 Moreover, the use of religious arguments in 
political debates does not automatically serve as a “showstopper”—only 
certain kinds of intolerant fundamentalist religious arguments are anathema 
to public discourse.213 
Posner’s central attack on democratic deliberation is based on a strong 
skepticism, which Posner claims is pragmatic. People have different 
positions, and there is no way to privilege one view over another, since 
doing so would assume some theory of objective truth, which, as Posner 
claims, the pragmatist rejects. Therefore, Posner concludes, not much 
meaningful deliberation can occur, and theory can do little useful work.  The 
Posnerian pragmatist is a skeptic who doubts “that anyone has a handle on 
the really big truths, especially those of a moral, religious, or political 
cast.”214 As a result, “pragmatists are inclined to throw up their hands and 
say, let the people decide such matters because there are no trustworthy 
experts on them.”215 “The problem of democracy, as of government 
generally, is to manage conflict among persons who, often arguing from 
incompatible premises, cannot overcome their differences by discussion.”216 
Therefore, Posner argues, democracy ends in a vote, which “is the 
antithesis of deliberation and the mark of its failure.”217 “Voting in a sense 
marks the failure of deliberative democracy, the failure to have achieved 
consensus through deliberation.”218 Posner contends that “the Concept 2 
democrat applauds the use of voting to resolve political disagreements 
because it is quick and nearly costless and because the most serious of those 
disagreements cannot be resolved by discussion anyway.”219 Voting is 
inevitable in a democracy, Posner believes, because discourse and 
deliberation don’t (and can’t) really function. “But in a morally 
heterogeneous nation like the United States, many issues can be resolved 
 
212. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
213. As Jürgen Habermas argues, 
While religious toleration is basic to a democratic constitutional state, in this way 
religious consciousness itself undergoes a learning process. With the introduction of a 
right to freedom of religious expression, all religious communities must adopt the 
constitutional principle of the equal inclusion of everyone. They cannot merely benefit 
from the toleration of the others, but must themselves face up to the generalized 
expectation of tolerance, with all the consequences this entails. 
Jürgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 2, 6 (2003). 
214. POSNER, supra note 6, at 105. 
215. Id. at 105-06. 
216. Id. at 112. 
217. Id. at 187. 
218. Id. at 222. 
219. Id. at 223. 
SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC 12/8/2003 12:00 PM 
2003] Radical Pragmatism 727 
only by the force surrogate that is majority vote.”220 Therefore, democracy 
for Posner is a “‘competitive struggle for the people’s vote and not 
discussion and decision among the people themselves.’”221 Democracy 
through voting is simply another means by which the powerful get 
their way, a nonviolent instantiation of might makes right. This is a very 
bleak vision. With democracy, we have just found a surrogate to avoid 
violence—nothing more. 
To be successful for Posner, debate apparently must result in total 
consensus and complete resolution of an issue. Since he believes that such 
resolution is impossible, debate must be endless, and any ending is thus a 
failure and abandonment of the discussion. Posner is wrong to assume that 
all deliberation must end in a decision. As Dewey observed, “All 
deliberation is a search for a way to act, not for a final terminus.”222 Voting 
is often not the end of debate. It is just a decision being made despite 
continuing disagreement and dialogue. 
Just because issues and elections are decided by a vote and everybody 
is not in agreement does not mean that deliberation and discussion play no 
role or have somehow failed. Posner demands too much from deliberation, 
and he creates a caricature of what Concept 1 democrats hope deliberation 
can achieve. Despite its flaws, political discourse is hardly dead in America. 
People do discuss and debate politics. Deliberation does influence how 
people vote. People change their minds based on discussions they have with 
others. Public debate often forces individuals to explain inconsistency or 
accept the consequences of their commitments. Ideas do percolate and 
spread throughout society. While these conversations may not always rise 
to a grand level of sophistication, they certainly occur. 
Pragmatism makes a radical break with philosophers who assume, like 
Kant, that practical ends must be generated by pure reason. It also diverges 
from theorists like Posner who, unable to embrace a Kantian theoretical 
project, forego theoretical criticism altogether and thereby privilege present 
dominant ideologies. As William James observed, pragmatism stands 
between the “tough-minded” and the “tender-minded.”223 Tough-minded 
empiricists focus on “facts in all their crude variety,” whereas tender-
minded rationalists focus on “abstract and eternal principles.”224 For James, 
pragmatism is a way to combine “willingness to take account of [facts]” 
with “intellectual abstraction.”225 
 
220. Id. at 138. 
221. Id. at 178 (quoting ALBERT WEALE, DEMOCRACY 98 (1999)). 
222. DEWEY, supra note 87, at 193, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 
1899-1924, supra note 72, at 134. 
223. JAMES, supra note 59, at 12. 
224. Id. at 9.  
225. Id. at 20.  
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As explained by James, the tough-minded are best described as 
“materialistic,” “pessimistic,” “sceptical,” and “going by ‘facts,’”226 many 
of Posner’s defining traits. Like the tough-minded empiricist, Posner rejects 
any role for philosophical theory. From a Deweyan perspective, Posner’s 
brand of empiricism views the world as “already constructed and 
determined.”227 “An empiricism which is content with repeating facts 
already past,” wrote Dewey, “has no place for possibility and for liberty.”228 
We are what we are, Posner seems to be telling us, and we should not only 
accept this, but embrace it. The pragmatist would almost surely disagree. 
More often than not, immediate and unquestioning surrender is the least 
pragmatic approach. 
Posner wrongly believes that deliberation must lead to consensus in 
order to have value. But deliberation furthers important values even when it 
does not produce consensus. For one thing, there is value in clarifying the 
conflict, not just in resolving it.229 Second, to the degree that we fail to 
recognize the divergence of viewpoints in our community, we are 
handicapped in our attempts to bridge the gaps. The failure to understand 
different perspectives can lead to hasty solutions based on inadequate 
descriptions of the problem. Third, in many contexts, individuals are at least 
as concerned with being heard as they are with instantiating their view of 
the “right answer.” 
B. Problems with Concept 2 Democracy 
In addition to arguing that Concept 1 democracy is not attainable, 
Posner also makes a more affirmative case for his claim that Concept 2 is 
“normatively superior.”230 Posner notes that “Concept 2 democrats often 
find redeeming value in features of American democracy that Concept 1 
democrats deplore.”231 But Posner’s Concept 2 democracy is not obviously 
pragmatic.  
Posner is emphatic in his praise for Concept 2, which he grounds in his 
pragmatism. He proclaims that ours is the “most successful political system 
since the Roman Empire!”232 But what are the normative criteria for 
 
226. Id. at 12. 
227. John Dewey, The Development of American Pragmatism, in 2 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY 
OF IDEAS 353, 365 (Dep’t of Philosophy of Columbia Univ. ed., 1925), reprinted in 2 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 3, 12-13. 
228. Id., reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 12. 
229. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE 133 (1998) (“We can try to use the beliefs of 
others as a partial check on our own. When we do this, our goal is not necessarily to reach 
agreement with others; rather, it is to use the project of explaining disagreement as a means of 
broadening our understanding of the social world.”). 
230. POSNER, supra note 6, at 130. 
231. Id. at 171. 
232. Id. at 182. 
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success? One could say glibly that Concept 2 democracy is better because it 
works, but whether Concept 2 “works” depends upon the normative goals 
we have, which in turn depend upon a theory of the good. One could also 
contend that Concept 2 democracy is better because it is more efficient, but 
again, since “efficiency” can only be evaluated in light of ends one wants to 
achieve, those ends are precisely the question at stake. Without knowing 
what one’s ends are, one cannot evaluate whether a social structure is 
efficient in achieving them. What are the ends that democracy should 
achieve? This brings us back again to the need for a theory of the good. 
So what is Posner’s theory of the good? Posner doesn’t tell us 
explicitly. Instead of a theory of the good, Posner offers a number of goals 
he believes democracy should achieve. He believes democracy should:  
(1) cost “very little . . . in time, money, and distraction from private 
pursuits commercial or otherwise”; 
(2) allow people to “punish at least the flagrant mistakes and 
misfeasances of officialdom”; 
(3) “assure an orderly succession of at least minimally competent 
officials”; 
(4) “generate feedback to the officials concerning the consequences 
of their policies”; 
(5) “prevent officials from (or punish them for) entirely ignoring 
the interests of the governed”; 
(6) “prevent serious misalignments between government action and 
public opinion”; and 
(7) avoid “placing electoral minorities at substantial risk of having 
their property rights or other liberties curtailed by the democratic 
majority.”233 
Posner does not offer an extensive justification of this vision of 
democracy, although it is hard to argue with these goals, since they are 
taken for granted in most formulations of democracy. What democratic 
theory wouldn’t prevent officials from “entirely ignoring the interests of the 
governed”?234 
Yet this is a remarkably thin set of goals for a working democracy. In 
fact, Posner’s normative ends for democracy can be boiled down to two 
 
233. Id. 
234. Id. (emphasis added). 
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goals: (1) promoting freedom for people to pursue their private interests, 
and (2) promoting political stability. Since Posner views Americans as 
essentially selfish atomistic individuals who just want to be left alone and 
not be bothered by politics, the point of a democratic system is to prevent 
obstacles from getting in their way. Indeed, the overarching concern that 
ties together the majority of the goals Posner lists is a commitment to 
stability, the keys to which involve ensuring the orderly succession of 
officials and allowing for minimal checks when the officials really get out 
of hand (punishing “flagrant mistakes” or “entirely ignoring” the public 
interest, and preventing gross disparities between the government and 
public opinion). Furthermore, Posner wants to protect against the tyranny of 
the majority, and one suspects he has in mind the instability that might be 
created when the majority wants to encroach on the property rights of the 
wealthy elite minority. Posner also argues that “Concept 2 democrats also 
don’t lose sleep over the possibility that an election might be won by a 
candidate who got fewer votes than his competitor, provided the margin is 
small. They worry more about deadlocked elections that produce delay or 
make Presidential succession uncertain.”235 In the good Posnerian society, 
stability is a central value. 
It will not surprise readers familiar with Posner’s longstanding support 
for markets that the goals of freedom to pursue private interests and 
stability are also important preconditions to a free market. In fact, when the 
smoke clears, it is a particular conception of the free market, and not 
democracy, that Posner seems most interested in fostering. Throughout the 
book, Posner extols the virtues of markets over political life: “Commercial 
activity and private life are not only more productive of wealth and 
happiness than the political life; they are also more peaceable, which in turn 
reinforces their positive effect on wealth and happiness.”236 Politics “is 
often a zero-sum or even a negative-sum game. Economic competition is 
more likely to be a positive-sum game.”237 On Posner’s account, political 
life is nasty and brutish and disruptive, akin to a kind of war, whereas 
market activity is constructive and encourages civil relations. 
But is market activity really better than political life? Posner writes: 
“Markets are a means of enabling potentially antipathetic strangers to 
transact peaceably with one other; and a superficial relationship, in which 
all the deep issues are bracketed, is the most productive basis on which to 
deal with strangers.”238 What kind of society would we be if all our 
interactions were like this? For many, the good life consists of more than 
having “superficial” relationships with others in society. It consists of 
 
235. Id. at 172. 
236. Id. at 173. 
237. Id. at 174. 
238. Id. at 31. 
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discussing and debating the “deep issues.” For Posner, only the intellectual 
elites can enjoy this type of deeper existence. But it is far from true that 
people generally don’t enjoy political discussions or any sort of political 
participation. 
Moreover, market activity can be nasty and disruptive. Many political 
decisions concern the regulation of market activity, for the market left alone 
can result in malfeasance and failures. Reining in commerce is a divisive 
issue in political life. The shape of the market itself cannot be resolved 
without recourse to politics.239 Therefore, Posner is wrong to assume a 
dichotomy between commercial and political life, viewing the market as 
some sort of insular paradise when, in fact, it is always already deeply 
infused with politics. 
C. Dewey, Pragmatism, and Democracy 
1. The Illusion of Neutrality 
Posner has stated time and again that pragmatism has “no inherent 
political valence.”240 Posner is not alone in this conclusion. According to 
Richard Rorty, pragmatism “is neutral between alternative prophecies, and 
thus neutral between democrats and fascists.”241 Since pragmatism on this 
account has no political valence, Posner argues that there is no connection 
between the pragmatic ideas of John Dewey and his political philosophy: 
“The connection between the liberal-visionary and the pragmatic is purely 
historical and contingent. It happens that John Dewey and some other 
pragmatist philosophers were also left-leaning political visionaries.”242 
Posner’s contention that Dewey’s political views “have no organic relation 
to his philosophy”243 is a necessary step in his justification of Concept 2 
democracy, for he takes many of Dewey’s basic pragmatic ideas but desires 
to use them to support a very different vision of democracy than Dewey, 
who was a Concept 1 democrat. 
If Posner is correct in his claim that pragmatism has no political 
valence, then it is puzzling how he can claim that Concept 2 democracy is 
the “democracy of the pragmatists.”244 It is difficult to imagine how an 
 
239. See THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE INGENUITY GAP 244-45 (2000) (“The relationship 
between government and the market is decidedly symbiotic. . . . Even in the most laissez-faire 
capitalist economies, markets float on a sea of complex institutions, regulations, and government 
interventions.”). 
240. POSNER, supra note 6, at 84; POSNER, supra note 19, at 393. 
241. Richard Rorty, The Professor and the Prophet, 52 TRANSITION 70, 75 (1991) (reviewing 
CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 
(1989)). 
242. POSNER, supra note 6, at 46. 
243. Id. at 98. 
244. Id. at 143. 
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inherently apolitical pragmatic method can be linked to one theory of 
democracy over another. Posner thus must resort to a variety of 
unpragmatic contortions to free himself from this logical bind. We have 
argued that Posner’s justification for Concept 2 democracy rests upon 
dubious foundations that resemble the type of reasoning pragmatism rejects. 
Although Posner contends that there is no connection between 
Deweyan democratic theory and pragmatism, he is mistaken. Of course, 
pragmatists have reached very different, sometimes mutually exclusive, 
political views. But the fact that pragmatists can arrive at different political 
conclusions does not imply that pragmatism is completely neutral as to 
which conclusions one might reach. 
Pragmatism refuses to accept on face value claims about methods being 
“neutral.” Rather, pragmatism recognizes that our critical investigations are 
infused with value commitments. No neutral determination is possible. 
Under this account, the point of philosophy is less a matter of securing 
objective truth and more a matter of facilitating effective growth in the face 
of particular problems. Pragmatism is not a method purified of experience. 
Pragmatism does not start out from some Archimedean point; it begins with 
commitments, which have certain valences. Pragmatism asks particular 
kinds of questions and suggests we abandon other types of questions. As 
Dewey argued, 
[T]he conviction persists—though history shows it to be a 
hallucination—that all the questions that the human mind has asked 
are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that 
the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress 
usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together 
with both of the alternatives they assume—an abandonment that 
results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent 
interest. We do not solve them: we get over them.245 
Since all questions guide the focus of our intellectual attention, they lead us 
in particular directions. 
For Dewey, pragmatism is not simply a tool external to democracy, and 
it would be a mistake to use pragmatism to determine the ideal democratic 
structure. This is not the type of question pragmatism suggests we 
investigate. For the pragmatist, there is no ideal democratic structure; 
 
245. JOHN DEWEY, The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, in THE INFLUENCE OF 
DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT, supra note 11, at 1, 
19, reprinted in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 3, 14. 
Richard Rorty follows this strategy. See RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, at 
xiv (1982) (“So pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This does 
not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but 
rather that they do not think we should ask those questions anymore. . . . They would simply like 
to change the subject.”). 
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rather, a democracy is a process whereby a community continually seeks to 
define itself as it moves into the future. A democracy is therefore not static, 
but continually evolving. Moreover, democracy is more than just a set of 
political structures; it is a way of making certain decisions about the future 
of the community. Dewey believed that democratic decisionmaking should 
be pragmatic. Pragmatists certainly agree that pragmatism is a more 
productive method of engaging our problems than other methods. Even 
Posner makes this argument, for his book is endorsing pragmatism, not 
merely describing it. To the extent that pragmatism is successful in this 
way, then not only individuals, but also entire communities, should engage 
in pragmatic inquiry. Democracy thus should consist of pragmatic inquiry 
at a community-wide level. Under this view, pragmatic democracy is, like 
pragmatism, a commitment to a form of inquiry—the endorsement of 
experimental method on the social and political stage. 
For Dewey, democracy is “a way of life, social and individual.”246 John 
Stuhr explains Dewey’s conception of democracy as “a form of life rather 
than a form of government alone.”247 Democratic government is “a means 
for realizing democratic ends in individual lives and social relationships.”248 
Under this view, democracy does not primarily consist of institutions or 
government structures: “Democracy exists only on paper and in statute 
unless individuals enact it in their own transactions day by day and face-to-
face in local communities. That is, a society of individuals can become a 
democracy only as those individuals act democratically.”249 As Dewey 
observed, “[D]emocracy is much broader than a special political form, a 
method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on 
governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected 
officers.”250 
Thus, even if our government has a democratic structure, we are not 
democratic unless we live our lives democratically. This injunction has 
consequences for the way we approach our democratic inheritance. We 
should not see democracy as something that has been accomplished simply 
by the choice of an appropriate set of representative governmental 
structures that can be passed down from generation to generation. Instead, 
the meaning of democracy must change continually with changes in lives 
 
246. John Dewey, Democracy and Educational Administration (Feb. 22, 1937), in AM. 
ASSOC. OF SCH. ADM’RS, NAT’L EDUC. ASSOC., OFFICIAL REPORT: NEW ORLEANS CONVENTION 
48, 49 (1937), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 
217, 217. 
247. JOHN J. STUHR, PRAGMATISM, POSTMODERNISM, AND THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY 51 
(2003). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 64. 
250. Dewey, supra note 246, at 49, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-
1953, supra note 11, at 217. 
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“and cultural conditions,”251 and this reconstruction is democratic only to 
the extent means are found to fully involve all members of the community 
in this reconstruction. 
While Posner’s thin account of pragmatism seems insufficient for 
generating substantive ends, a thicker account of pragmatism recommends 
that a community pragmatically reconstruct its ends.252 On this thicker 
account, democracy and pragmatism go hand in hand. As Hilary Putnam 
observes, for Dewey democracy is “not just a form of social life among 
other workable forms of social life; it is the precondition for the full 
application of intelligence to the solution of social problems.”253 Certain 
characteristics of democracy facilitate the community’s engaging in 
pragmatic inquiry about the future shape of its democracy. Pragmatic 
inquiry enables a community to make itself more democratic. Pragmatism 
and democracy are thus mutually reinforcing. 
2. Pragmatism’s Valences 
The account of Deweyan pragmatism we sketched in Part I recognizes 
that pragmatism is not neutral. Of course, this account of pragmatism does 
not imply a specific theory of political philosophy. But it does have 
valences. In order to ask what political future pragmatism recommends, we 
must also ask in what political culture pragmatic forms of inquiry about the 
political future can best be carried out. The answer to this latter question 
leads us in the direction of what we call a “general democratic culture.” 
First, as discussed in Part I, pragmatism subjects existing institutions 
and the status quo to ongoing critique, since it recommends that we 
critically examine our ends. When one commits oneself to a thorough use 
of pragmatic method, certain conclusions are ruled out in advance, such as a 
politics informed by supernatural or transcendental ideals, or a politics that 
arbitrarily excludes particular viewpoints. Supernaturalism and absolutism 
conflict with the general approach of the pragmatic method, which is to 
subject our ideals, ends, and conclusions to the test of experience. Indeed, it 
is this commitment that in part motivates Posner’s rejection of 
philosophical theory, for much philosophical theory has traditionally 
harbored ideological commitments that were then foisted upon the unaware 
from the altar of theory. But the fear of ideology can lead to cures that are 
worse than the disease. Although Posner claims to adhere to a neutral 
 
251. STUHR, supra note 247, at 72. 
252. For a discussion of the method that such pragmatic reconstruction might take, see JAMES 
CAMPBELL, THE COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTS: THE MEANING OF PRAGMATIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 
38-58 (1992). 
253. Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671, 
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pragmatic method without political valences, the results of his application 
of this method are deeply ensconced in ideology. Posner’s pragmatism does 
have a particular political valence—one that favors the dominant ends of 
the status quo. The result is that while Posnerian pragmatism rejects 
supernaturalism and absolutism, it starts with an unquestioning acceptance 
of current institutions. Ironically, it winds up in a similar posture to 
supernaturalism and absolutism, for in each of these instances certain issues 
are insulated from critical scrutiny. 
Second, under Deweyan pragmatism, democracy depends upon 
deliberation. Democratic deliberation is the way we establish shared 
meanings and determine the ends of a community. It is important to 
distinguish between individual and community ends. Individuals can 
readily choose their own ends, but for communities, the task is more 
difficult. This is because a community’s ends depend on the identity of the 
community, which must be ascertained by examining the history of that 
community and soliciting input from across the community as a whole. 
Examining community identity leads us to ask: Who are we becoming? 
How are we growing? Do we want to continue in this fashion? Who do we 
want to become? There is no movement into the future that does not 
presuppose a judgment about the past and present. Pragmatists therefore 
need to encourage public deliberation about our identity since there is no 
way to determine what is better or worse without reference to that identity.  
Since community rather than individual ends are at issue, dialogue 
becomes essential. Community ends are determined collectively, and doing 
so requires communication. This dialogue does not need to be an 
academically sophisticated discourse; rather, pragmatism merely requires 
that people participate in a discussion of the meaning of ends understood in 
the context of present circumstances. These are philosophical discussions 
not because they take place in universities, but because they ask about the 
good life under present social conditions. A pragmatic approach to 
democracy is one that understands itself as part of existing political 
conversations about the nature and ends of the community. 
Third, since experience is social and meanings are constituted through 
communication, efforts to describe experience and formulate an account of 
social problems must seek contributions from a wide range of participants 
in social experience. As William Caspary observes, “Dewey is, above all, a 
participatory democracy theorist.”254 According to Dewey, a citizen must 
have “a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the 
activities of the groups to which [she] belongs.”255 Under Dewey’s theory, 
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participation is a highly valued end.256 For Posner, in contrast, participation 
has no value unless it can achieve results that benefit one’s self-interest. 
Beyond being valuable in and of itself, participation is valuable 
instrumentally as well. According to Dewey, self-government “is 
educative,” for it “forces a recognition that there are common interests.”257 
Thus, the purpose of democracy is not to take the people as they are. The 
value of democratic participation is to educate people, to enable them to 
realize common interests and see themselves as part of a community. 
Dewey’s experimental method does not simply consist of presenting 
hypotheses; rather, it requires testing proposals to resolve present problems 
by seeing how they work in experience. Interpreting the social meaning of a 
particular set of experiments requires recourse to the larger community. As 
Posner himself notes, different individuals’ experiences lead them to 
approach problems in different ways, and some approaches work better 
than others for particular problems.258 Accordingly, we increase our 
chances of finding effective solutions to social problems by looking to a 
broad range of contributors. 
Therefore, in contrast to Posnerian pragmatism, the account of 
pragmatism we offer openly acknowledges that it is not completely neutral. 
Although pragmatism does not point to precise resolutions for our debates, 
it does send us in a particular direction based on the types of questions it 
recommends we investigate. It puts on the table for debate a wide range of 
issues, especially the identity of a community and its ends. It requires 
dialogue, for the task of determining a community’s ends cannot be 
achieved without communication. And it relies on the participation of the 
community, not merely upon a group of elites who impose their own ends 
upon the community. 
Since democracy depends upon the widespread participation of a 
community in a dialogue over its ends, the pragmatist pays special attention 
to questions concerning the conditions for effective community discussion. 
Posner rejects such questions as hopeless and doomed because it is not 
realistic to achieve complete community engagement. But these are 
precisely the ways in which a community pragmatically resolves the more 
specific political arrangements it shall adopt. Because this account of 
 
256. In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey observes: 
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all 
singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to 
effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared 
by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all 
its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. 
Id. at 149, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 328. 
257. Id. at 207, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, 
at 364. 
258. POSNER, supra note 6, at 101-02. 
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pragmatism suggests that we engage in a critical examination of the 
dominant ends of society, and that we must do so through dialogue and 
through broad community participation, it points us more toward Concept 1 
democracy than Concept 2. This does not foreclose us from embracing 
some features of Concept 2, but it certainly rejects the insular nature of 
Concept 2, which leaves too few avenues for dialogue and community 
engagement. 
One might object that this account of pragmatism and its relationship to 
democracy is circular, as the community’s project of shaping its democracy 
depends, in part, on the existence of a general democratic culture. Despite 
the circularity, the circle is not vicious. The general democratic culture 
required is quite broad and does not come close to the level of specificity 
required in the project of determining what particular form a democracy 
shall take. But the general democratic culture, as we have defined it, is not 
independent of the more particular forms of democracy that the community 
adopts. Indeed, the community’s specific democratic arrangements shape its 
general democratic culture. How, then, can a community with political 
arrangements that do not facilitate a general democratic culture ever 
transform itself through pragmatic inquiry into a more robust democracy? 
The answer is that a democracy need not be perfect (or even close to 
perfect) to engage in pragmatic inquiry. Certainly there have been many 
democracies that have not begun democratically; this did not mean that they 
were doomed. Dewey’s pragmatic method counsels us constantly to remake 
our democracy; we do not just pass it along like a dead object. The key 
point is for a community to keep attempting to engage in democratic 
pragmatic inquiry and to think of ways to help facilitate it. Such a 
democracy is achieved not by establishing an ideal political structure, but 
through the sustained incremental development of the capacities of citizens 
for developing shared values. Democracy, on this view, is akin to an 
activity that one improves through practice. Democracy is something that a 
community does, not merely a particular set of rules and structures. 
3. Toward a Thicker Account of Democracy 
Although our account of pragmatism points us toward certain broad 
features of Concept 1, more work is necessary to develop thicker accounts 
of democracy. In other words, while the pragmatic method has substantive 
valences, it does not dictate the specific contours of a democratic theory. It 
points us in a general direction. Commitment to pragmatic method does not 
entail, prima facie and in advance of application, a commitment to a 
particular politics or narrow conception of democracy. On the contrary, 
these conceptions are what one discovers and constructs through such 
investigation. Central to Dewey’s pragmatism is a commitment to inquiry 
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into one’s present social and cultural conditions. Empirical inquiry does not 
form its conclusions in advance of experience. 
Therefore, Posner is partially correct when he claims that Dewey’s 
politics was “historical and contingent.”259 Indeed, Dewey’s politics was the 
result of his best efforts to inquire into the problems of the times and 
formulate proposals to ameliorate them. Naturally, Dewey’s political 
conclusions bear a historical relationship to the problems of Dewey’s day. 
But this fact does not support Posner’s conclusion that Dewey’s politics 
bears no “organic relationship” to Dewey’s pragmatism. 
Regardless of whether Dewey’s specific policy recommendations were 
the most productive responses to the problems he examined, the important 
point is that pragmatism recommends a certain kind of discussion. It 
requires considering the competing views of our history and explaining why 
some views should be seen as superior. Whether or not there is an “organic 
relationship” between the application of pragmatic method and the 
development of a particular politics is not a matter of drawing out the 
logical entailments of pragmatic method. Instead, it is a matter of assessing 
the historical record of the actual application of that method in attempts to 
respond to a given set of problems. 
Pragmatic democratic inquiry would lead us to ask: What are the 
pressing problems of the day? What are the relevant community ends? 
What means can we use to achieve these ends? The inquiry would also go 
deeper to ask: To what extent are the community ends contested? What is 
the pedigree of the prevailing community ends? How did these ends 
become the prevailing ones? For what purposes were these ends originally 
adopted? Do the reasons these ends were adopted still have currency today? 
To the extent that there are competing accounts of a community’s ends, can 
common ground be discovered? 
The pragmatist would also recognize that answering these questions 
pragmatically at the community level requires certain features of a 
democratic culture—ones that may need significant improvement. The 
quality of our pragmatic inquiry into the above questions depends upon the 
quality of our democratic culture. To improve that culture, the pragmatist 
would explore ways to improve public deliberation and civic participation. 
For example, the pragmatist would look to improving education, which 
enables individuals to assess experience critically and share their 
assessments with others. The pragmatist might also examine how to 
promote new means of communication to enable democratic discussions to 
take place.260 
 
259. Id. at 46. 
260. For a provocative discussion of the resources and challenges of this project in the age of 
the Internet, see CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 191-202 (2001). 
SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC 12/8/2003 12:00 PM 
2003] Radical Pragmatism 739 
One might object that such projects are not pragmatic because they are 
often engineered by elites. Deweyan democracy, however, need not be 
antagonistic to elites so long as elites see their role as guiding and advising 
the public rather than running the show with minimal public 
involvement.261 Thus, intellectuals must avoid engaging in isolated 
conversations with each other and attempt to engage in more inclusive 
public debates. 
Posner would also respond that these projects are too utopian because 
too many people do not want to participate and are not educated enough to 
do anything but vote. But as discussed earlier in this Part, the pragmatist 
does not simply accept human nature as given. Democracy, for Dewey, is 
about the “maturing and fruition of the potentialities of human nature.”262 
Dewey’s view of human nature is inspired in part by Darwin, for Dewey 
recognizes that people constantly adjust and adapt to their environments.263 
Pragmatists consciously grapple with the challenge of developing human 
potential rather than allowing it to remain adrift. 
Dewey’s response is that institutions must be changed; further 
experimentation is needed in order to help enable society to become more 
democratic. In this way, Dewey was idealistic about democracy. He 
believed that a commitment to democracy makes “claims upon our future 
conduct” and therefore it “is an ideal.”264 Dewey would not view the charge 
that Concept 1 is idealistic as troubling at all; he would say that this is 
precisely the point of democracy. As Stuhr puts it, 
[A]s an ideal, democracy is not simply “unreal.” As an ideal, it is—
or may be or may become—a deep commitment, grasped by 
imagination, that draws lives together, makes meaningful our 
efforts, and directs our actions. As an ideal, it is generated through 
imagination, but it is not “made out of imaginary stuff.” . . .  
To describe democratic life as an ideal . . . is not so much to 
state a present fact as it is to recommend a future course of action, 
an admittedly radical course of action.265 
 
261. See BRUCE KUKLICK, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 1720-2000, at 190 
(2001) (noting that for Dewey, “the role of experts was to gain knowledge, but the public had to 
determine the problems to be investigated”). 
262. DEWEY, supra note 150, at 125, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 152. 
263. See JAMES CAMPBELL, UNDERSTANDING JOHN DEWEY 37-38 (1995). Posner repeatedly 
discusses the influence of Darwin on pragmatism. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 4-5, 10, 31-32. 
264. STUHR, supra note 247, at 55. 
265. Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The normative goal of democracy for Dewey was the realization of 
people’s full capacities.266 For Dewey, then, unlike Posner, one cannot 
simply take human beings and social institutions as one finds them: 
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of 
human nature; faith in human intelligence, and in the power of 
pooled and cooperative experience. It is not belief that these things 
are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to 
generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide 
collective action.267 
In the end, Dewey was committed to using the power of intelligence to 
bring about a better society capable of facilitating the growth of individuals. 
He was convinced that the form and commitment to inquiry that had so 
decisively enabled us to increase our control over nature in the realm of 
science and technology might also be used to improve the political 
governance of society. But he knew that assessment of this claim would 
have to await the results of trying to put it into practice. From Dewey’s 
point of view, it was far too early to pronounce pragmatic attempts at 
reconstruction as failures or successes, because by and large they simply 
had not been tried. This remains true today. Even as Posner recommends 
our realistic acquiescence to the status quo, his claims that aspirations for a 
more deliberative society are too utopian seem driven more by his 
affirmation of the present than by any demonstration that improvement is 
not possible. 
CONCLUSION 
In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner has set out his most 
thorough account of legal pragmatism to date. Posner views ideals as 
useless and philosophical theorizing as empty. Lacking any meaningful 
approach for scrutinizing social goals, pragmatism thus devolves into an 
efficiency exercise. The task of the pragmatist becomes merely finding the 
appropriate means to achieve our given ends. While this search for means 
may take a critical form, Posner’s account has little to say about the 
selection of ends. Accordingly, his attack on abstract ideals becomes, in 
effect, an endorsement of such ideals, since it leaves unreconstructed the 
dominant moral ideals of present society. 
 
266. DEWEY, supra note 147, at 56-57, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 41. 
267. Dewey, supra note 246, at 50, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-
1953, supra note 11, at 219. 
SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC 12/8/2003 12:00 PM 
2003] Radical Pragmatism 741 
It is not surprising, therefore, that in his theory of democracy, Posner is 
not interested in promoting methods for the community to develop shared 
ideals. Rather, the pressing need is for a set of elite managers to serve as 
efficiency experts, whose goal is to find the most efficient means to achieve 
our inherited ends. Posner’s view has significant consequences for thinking 
about the nature of democratic community. Since people are not 
encouraged to make any effort to form a community on the basis of shared 
ideals, the dominant normative ideals of society are left to drift 
haphazardly. Society becomes little more than the collective actions of 
atomistic individuals. Thus, as with the market, Posner views the 
equilibrium that emerges from individuals who pursue their own private 
interests as sufficient to generate the larger social ethos. 
Posner’s pragmatism, having eschewed attempts to evaluate ends 
critically and having effectively pronounced its agnosticism about 
community ends, leads naturally to a vision of democracy as principally an 
efficient mechanism for dispute resolution. This vision of democracy is 
conservative not only because it privileges the inherited demands of the 
present, but even more because it rules out as misguided the projects of 
reconstructing community identity through public deliberation. In contrast, 
the pragmatism of the early pragmatists, especially Dewey, encourages us 
to approach our present problems more radically. We should subject both 
means and ends to critical inquiry and empower communities to engage in 
self-formation by reconstructing the settled habits and ideals that constitute 
the status quo. For Dewey, “The end of democracy is a radical end. For it is 
an end that has not been adequately realized in any country at any time. It is 
radical because it requires great change in existing social institutions, 
economic, legal and cultural.”268 
Posner is right in his general view that pragmatism has much to offer to 
law, as well as to democracy. Its contribution, however, is not a rejection of 
philosophical theory but a transformation of how we relate theory to 
practice. Far from being banal or timorous, far from accepting our current 
practices and institutions as given realities, pragmatism subjects them to 
criticism and reconstruction. Unfortunately, Dewey’s provocative 
suggestions for reconstruction were never fully developed with respect to 
jurisprudence. We hope that increasing interest in legal pragmatism will 
facilitate this worthwhile experiment. 
 
268. John Dewey, Democracy Is Radical, COMMON SENSE, Jan. 1937, at 10, 11, reprinted in 
11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 296, 298-99 (emphasis 
omitted). 
